

For

Q1-H-10

Drauer 10a

Comander-in-Chief

71 2004 065 0433

Commander in Chief

Foreign Relations

71.2009.085.04333

SCANNED

LINC

Abraham Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief

Foreign Relations

Excerpts from newspapers and other sources

From the files of the
Lincoln Financial Foundation Collection

OUR RELATIONS WITH MEXICO. *Washington, 23d.* The President today sent a message to the Senate, in answer to a resolution of the 13th inst., accompanied by a very voluminous correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Mexican Charge d'Affaires, relative to the exportation of articles contraband of war for the use of the French army in Mexico. The Mexican Minister, Senor Romazo, in the first letter, asks the government to prevent contraband shipments purchased by the emissaries of the commander of the French expedition from leaving the ports of the United States. Mr. Seward replies, referring the Minister to a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, from which it appears that no intervention with the mission of the French officers is contemplated by the Treasury Department, a decision in conformity with precedents and with the rules of international law governing the cases. Citations are made to such authorities as Hamilton, Webster, and executive documents.

Senor Romazo expresses pain and surprise at the decision acquiesced in by the Secretary of State. He quotes Vattel, not to teach the government of the United States, but to give his opinion of the impropriety of allowing a belligerent to provide itself with the means of warfare in a neutral nation, and reviews the cases cited by Mr. Seward. He refers to the alleged shipping of the provisions by merchants of New York to the French army near Vera Cruz, and to calling the attention of Mr. Seward to those facts, who replied that the United States did not recognize a state of war existing between Mexico and the allies, as there had been no declaration of war, and therefore the United States could not be governed in their conduct by the rules of neutrals.

He further stated that subsequently he made application to the Secretary of the Treasury for a permit to ship some arms purchased in New York for the use of the Mexicans to a Mexican blockaded port, that the Secretary at first appeared ready to grant it, but on learning that the number was 88,000, he thought it too great, and referred the matter to the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments; that the Secretary of the Navy made no objections, but the Secretary of War refused to relax the order previously issued forbidding the exportation of arms. In vain he showed that they were percussion muskets—flint locks altered to percussion, which the United States would not use, and he was compelled to believe that his ill success was occasioned by a desire on the part of the United States to avoid complicity with France, and was afterwards astonished when wagons and mules were bought here for the French army, to find that what was denied to Mexico was freely permitted to France.

Mr. Seward replied that the prohibition of the shipment of arms was general, applying to all nations, on the ground of the military necessity of the United States; but there was no such inhibition of the shipment of wagons either for France or Mexico.

A long correspondence on the same points occurs, which Mr. Seward gracefully concludes as follows: "The undersigned, while he sees no cause further to expatiate on the reasons heretofore offered in explanation of that measure, avails himself of this occasion to offer Mr. Romazo a renewed assurance of his high consideration."

WASHINGTON ITEMS. *Jan. 23.* The President sent to the Senate today a message, and accompanying it the resolutions of the corporate authorities of Washington, with a memorial relating to the Metropolitan railroad lines, asking attention to the subject as a matter of importance.

Post Master General Blair says, in answer to a call from the House, that the annual cost of mail transportation to New York is \$93,250, of which \$18,500 is paid to the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company; \$20,050 to the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Co.; \$37,500 to the Philadelphia, Washington and Baltimore Railroad Co.; \$12,000 to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.; and \$9800 to the Camden and Amboy Railroad Co. In addition, \$6873 is given to local agents and messengers, and \$7200 for route agents.

It is not certain that the finance bill will pass as amended by the Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union. The substitute of Mr. Stevens, as essentially modified, has many friends. It authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow nine hundred millions, and to issue for any part of the amount legal tender notes bearing interest payable semi-annually in coin at the rate of a cent a day, redeemable at the pleasure of the government in sums of not less than \$10, such notes to be receivable for all dues excepting the duties on imports and interest on bonds, the amount of non-interest bearing notes, as soon as practicable, to be reduced, and the maximum not to exceed three hundred millions.

The payment of the awards made by the Emancipation Commission of the District of Columbia will be commenced at the office of the United States Treasurer on Monday next.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has decided that whenever a manufacturer of agricultural implements authorizes an agent or agents to sell such implements at wholesale, at places other than the place of manufacture, such agent or agents will not be required as authority for such sales to take licenses as dealers or peddlers. If, however, such agent or agents shall sell such implements at retail, licenses will be required under section 64, article 5 or article 27.

The Arabia's mail contradicts fully and emphatically the report from Paris and London of the movements or speeches of the Emperor of France in regard to the American civil war.

The three assassins of the American missionary, Mr. Merriam, have been executed. Great praise is accorded by the American Minister to the Sultan of Turkey for his firmness in the matter.

1-24

OFFICIAL RECEPTION OF THE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY FROM THE SANDWICH ISLANDS.

The President has given an audience of reception to the Hon. Elisha H. Allen, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty Kamehameha IV., King of the Hawaiian Islands. Mr. Allen in presenting his credentials said:—

ADDRESS OF THE MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

You are aware that citizens of the United States residing in the Hawaiian kingdom outnumber all foreigners, and have a very large interest in trade, commerce and agriculture. The commercial relations with the United States, which are constantly increasing in importance, and the geographical position of the islands as well, render some further treaty stipulations desirable and highly important. The rapid growth of that portion of the United States bordering on the Pacific, in population and commerce, renders the produce of the islands of great value to it, and the constantly increasing trade of equal importance to the islands. The desire of the King is to foster these great interests, equally advantageous, by the most liberal policy; and he feels assured, from the history of the past interviews with the United States government, that the same spirit will mark its course in the future.

REPLY OF THE PRESIDENT.

To which the President replied:—

Sir—In every light in which the State of the Hawaiian Islands can be contemplated, it is an object of profound interest for the United States. Virtually it was once a colony. It is now a near and intimate neighbor. It is a haven of shelter and refreshment for our merchants, fishermen, seamen and other citizens, when on these lawful occasions they are navigating the Eastern seas and oceans. Its people are free, and its laws, language and religion are largely the fruits of our own teaching and example. The distinguished part which you, Mr. Minister, have acted in the history of that interesting country is well known here. It gives me pleasure to assure you of my sincere desire to do what I can to render now your sojourn in the United States agreeable to yourself, satisfactory to your sovereign and beneficial to the Hawaiian people.

Messrs. Editors: I have just received a letter from Rev. Byron Sunderland, the American clergyman at Paris and former pastor of the 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ street Presbyterian church of this city, and Chaplain of the United States Senate, from which I send the following extracts, which may instruct and interest the loyal public:—K.L.C.

The good cause of our country proceeds apace. God be praised! The late election has knocked our enemies in Europe between the eyes. All the despots and all the enemies of free government have been calling the attention of the millions in Europe to the last great failure of Republics, as they took it for granted that it must be a failure in America. And now, just as they have pointed their finger and got the gaze of the whole world upon us to witness our downfall, behold! we do not fall! but stand, and rise up greater than ever. We must see the hand of God in this. Is it not glorious! Great things must come of it. The politics and religion of Europe are being silently affected to-day by the re-election of Lincoln, in the way and result of it, more than any other event which has happened the present century. The long problem is solved; a great people may be capable—are capable—of self-government! From this hour the papacy tumbles—aristocracy tumbles—monarchy tumbles—imperialism tumbles, and up go the rights of the great eternal people, without distinction of race or color, east or complexion, founded on the everlasting, God-given principles of equality and right. So may it be.

A DIPLOMATIC VISITOR—The Bey of Tunis has announced his intention to send here an Envoy Extraordinary, to congratulate our government on the triumph of its arms in suppressing rebellion, and to express his good will. It will probably be General Houssein, who has written an admirable letter on Tunisian slavery, and he will be accompanied, at the Bey's desire, by Mr. Amos Perry, our Consul at Tunis. The Bey has had his portrait painted, which, with some specimens of the manufactures, will be sent as a present to the President. Of course, he will be received as a guest of the nation, and treated with distinguished consideration.

May 29, 1865

Lecture by Thomas Hughes, M. P.

There was need at first for any organization. Until after the battle of Manassas Junction in 1861, there was scarcely any public expression of sympathy with the rebellion. The Times and that portion of the press which follows its lead, and is always ready to go in for the side they think will win, were lecturing on the wickedness of the war and the absurdity of the rebel States in supposing that they could regain a portion of the South of the North. The news of that first defeat arrived, and this portion of our press swung round, and the strong feeling in favor of the rebellion

Something must be done to counteract this, to put the case clearly before our people. Mr. Mason and his friends were already establishing a Confederate States Aid Association; it must be met by something similar on the right side. The American Colonization Society and the Union and Emancipation societies were started in London, Manchester, and in good time came Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of emancipation to strengthen our hands. The original manifesto of these societies declared their object to be to "clear by the force of indisputable testimony that the South is not only avaricious, but that the North is fully committed to the destruction of slavery, and that the principal object for which this society is organized. Its promoters do not believe that English anti-slavery sentiment is dead or unfeeling. They are confident that when the denials and delays are over, it will be made clear, that there will be no danger of England being entirely made friendly with them." We pledged ourselves to test the opinion of the country everywhere by public meetings, and challenged the Confederate States Aid Association to accompany even *quasi* public meetings, but I never could hear of any. That meeting was at Mr. Mason's house, and was, I believe, attended by some fifty persons.

THE FIRST STEP

of our society was to hold meetings for passing an address of congratulation to you, and also for the publication of the emancipation proclamation on the publication of the Year's eve, 1862. Our address said: "We have watched with the warmest interest the steady advance of your policy along the path of emancipation; and on this eve of the day on which your proclamation takes effect we pray God to strengthen your hands, to confirm your noble purpose, and to hasten the restoration of the full authority which engages, in peace or war, by compensation, the force of arms, to realize the glorious principle on which your constitution is founded—the brotherhood, freedom and equality of all men." The address was enthusiastically accepted by a large meeting, chiefly composed of workingmen, for we became objects of their attack. The Times called us impostors, and said we got on our knees for the agitation from American sources—the fact being that we always refused contributions from this side. The Saturday Review declared, in one of its bitterest attacks, "anything could be calculated upon as likely to deter and delay the gradual extinction of slavery it would be Mr. Lincoln's unhesitating abolition of it. We were middle-class fanatics, insignificant nobodies, mischievous agitators. This was satisfactory and encouraging. We felt sure that we had taken the right course, and not a moment too soon. Thus came bound to public meetings, which you at least are surely bound to accept as a fair gauge of what a people thinks and wills.

FIRST MEETING OF THE LIBERALS.

Our first war was held on the 29th of January, 1863. We took Exeter Hall, the largest and most central in London. We did nothing but simply advertise widely, and such a meeting would be held, inviting all who cared to come, foes as well as friends. Prudent and timid people shook their heads and looked grave. The cotton famine was at its worst, and tens of thousands of our work people were starving, "as they call it, starving, as you might say." You would be asked as black as they had ever done; it was almost the day of the whole war. Even friends warned us that we should be a bad object, and only do harm by showing our weakness; that the Confederate States Aid Association would spare no pains or money to break up the meeting, and a hundred roofs sent there by them might turn it into a triumph for the rebellion. However, on we went,—we knew our own people too well to fear the result. The night came, and familiar as we were to this kind of thing, I have never seen in my time anything so successful as this one. Remember, there was nothing to attract the eyes of well-known orators, for we always thought it best to keep our unharmed men to their own ground; no great success to rejoice in, for you were just feeling under the recoil of your gallant army from the blood-stained heights of Fredericksburg; no attack on our own government; no appeal to political or social hates or prejudices; only the words that made friends with the invitation, "Now let Englishmen come forward and show on which side their sympathies really are in this war." The attending at these disadvantages the great hall was densely crowded, so that there was no standing room, and the Strand and the neighboring streets blocked with a crowd of thousands who could find no place, long before the doors were open. We were obliged to organize a number of meetings on the spur of the moment in the lower halls, and even in the lower streets, and the great hall, where two clergymen, the Hon. Baptist Minister, and the Hon. Wesleyan Minister, were the chief speakers, as well as one of the most eloquent speakers, we carried, not only without a dissent, but, so far as I remember, without a single hand being held up on the other side, resolutions in favor of your government of the Union and of emancipation. The suc-

cess was so complete that

IN LONDON OUR WORK WAS DONE.

Then followed similar meetings at Manchester, Sheffield, Bristol, Leeds, in all the great centres of population, with precisely the same result. I don't remember that the enemy ever even attempted to divide a meeting. The country was carried by acclamation. Our friends in Liverpool wrote with some anxiety as to the state of feeling there, and asked me to go down and deliver an address. I went, and the meeting carried the same resolutions by very large majorities, and those who I thought would oppose the proceedings thought better of it when they saw the tenor of the proceedings, and were quiet. You will remember that the same thing happened when Mr. Beecher was there. Without troubling you with any further details of our work, I may just add, as a proof of how those who profess to be the most astute worshippers of public opinion changed their minds in consequence of the answer of the country to our appeals, that in August, 1863, the Times supported our demand on the government for the stoppage of the steam

In addition to this political movement, we instituted also a system of brethren's aid associations. In order that those abolitionists of England who were still unable to put faith in your Government might have an opportunity of helping in their own way. These associations entered into correspondence with those on your side, and sent over a good many thousand pounds' worth of clothing and other supplies, besides money. I forget the exact amount. It was a mere drop in the ocean of your magnificent war charities, but it came from thousands who had little else to give. I trust, however, that you will not despise the effect of a peace offering with abundant hearts, and who are conversant with the facts, and are ready to judge by their actual doings even those against whom they think they have fair cause of complaint.

THE UNOFFICIAL OR EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE

in England during your war. And now let me turn to the action of your government, and of Parliament. I might fairly have rested my case entirely upon this ground. In the case of nations blessed as America and England are, with perfect freedom of speech and action within the limits of law, where men may say the thing they will freely, and without any check but the civil courts, no one in my judgment has a right to make the nation responsible for anything except what its government says and does. But I know how deeply the conduct and speech of English society has outraged your people, and still rankles in their minds, and I wished by some rough analysis, and by the use of some of the words of my own knowledge, and of doings in which I personally took part, to show you that you have done us very scant justice. The nose, and the stomach and digestive apparatus, of England were hostile to you, and you have taken them for the nation: the brain and heart and muscle of England were on your side, and these you have ignored and forgotten.

THE NEUTRALITY PROCLAMATION.

Now, for our government and Parliament, I will admit at once, if you please, that Lord Palmerston and the principal members of his cabinet were not friendly to you, and would have been glad to see your republic broken up. I am by no means sure that it was so; but let that pass. I was not in their counsels, and have no means of judging of them than are open to all of you. Your first accusation against us is, that the Queen's proclamation of neutrality which was signed and published on the 12th of May, was in principle, and an act of discourtesy to your government, inasmuch as your new minister, Mr. Adams, only arrived in England on that very day. Well, looking back from this distance of time, I quite admit that it would have been far better to have delayed the publication of the proclamation till after he had arrived in London. But at the time the case was very different. You must remember that news of the President's proclamation of the blockade reached London on May 3. Of course, from that moment, the danger of collision between our vessels and yours, of the dragging out of privaters in our harbours, arose at once, and in the course of your first capture of a British vessel, the General Packhall of Liverpool, was made on May 12. But, if the publication of the proclamation of neutrality was a mistake, it was made by our government at the earnest solicitation of Mr. Forster and other warm friends of yours, who pressed it forward entirely, as they supposed, in your interest. They wanted to let the British vessels go, and to let the blockading squadron, and put British merchants who lost their ships, at once out of court. The government acted at their instance, and so, whether a blunder or not, the proclamation was not unkindly acted. Besides remember

WHAT IT AMOUNTED TO.

simply and solely to a recognition of the fact that you had a serious war on hand. Mr. Seward had already admitted this in an official paper of the 4th of May, and your Supreme Court decided, in the case of the *Wyandwick*, that the proclamation of blockade was in itself conclusive evidence that a state of war existed at the time. If we had never gone a step further, if we had recognized the independence of the rebel States, as our government has now urged, we should have been justified, by members of your parliament, and lastly by the Emperor, in saying that you would have had good ground of offence. But this was precisely what we never would do; and when they found this out the Confederate government cut off all intercourse with England and expelled our consuls from their towns. So one side blamed us for doing too much and the other for doing too little. I am quite of the opinion of neutrals, as you yourselves are finding at the moment in the case of the war between the States and France.

THE STRUGGLE IN PARLIAMENT.

Then came the first public effort of the sympathizers with the rebellion. After several preliminary skirmishes, which were defeated by Mr. Foster (who had what we have called the watching brief, with Cobden and Bright behind him, each ready to jump in and take the lead in the lobbies in those anxious days like a well-trained infantry man, with his pockets bulging out with documents to prove how effective the blockade was, and how many ships of our merchants you were capturing every day) Mr. Gregory put a motion on the paper. It was well chosen for the purpose, as a member of great experience and ability, sitting on our side of the house so that weak-kneed liberals would have an excuse for following him, and though not himself in office supposed to be on the same terms with the premier and other members of the cabinet. His motion was simply to call the attention of the house to the expediency of prompt recognition of the Southern Confederacy."

It was set down for June 7, 1861, and I tell you we were all pretty nervous about the result. The Spectator, Daily News, Star and other staunch papers opened fire, and we all did what we could in the way of canvassing; but until the government had declared itself, no Union man could say a word. We Lord, Lord, Russell, as the foreign minister, not to mention the Lord, Lord, Russell, said that the government had no intention whatever of recognizing it, and recommended its withdrawal. So Mr. Gregory and his friends took their motion off the paper without a vote.

bate, and did not venture to try any other during the session of 1861. In the late autumn came the untimely French invasion, to which I have already sufficiently alluded. Rejoicing on the feeling which had been roused by it, and cheered on by the Mason Club in Piccadilly and the *Index* newspaper's fulminations, and by the severe checks of the Union armies, they took the field again in 1862. This time their tactics were bolder. They no longer confined themselves to the opinion of the House deputedly, but in Lindsey the armed soldiery were no longer denied a small fleet of blockade runners, was chosen their spokesman. He gave notice of motion, "That in the opinion of this House, the States which have seceded from the Union have so long maintained themselves and given strength of determination and ability to support independence, that the propriety of offering mediation with a view to terminating hostilities is worthy of the serious and immediate consideration of the Government." Again we trembled for the result, and again the same outcome came with a square refusal on the 18th of July, and this action shared the fate of its predecessor, and was withdrawn by its own promoters.

THE ESCAPE OF THE ALABAMA

Then came the escape of the Alabama. Upon this I have no word to say. My private opinion is that you expressed over and over again, in Parliament, where on my first year, 1866, I think I was the first man to urge arbitration on our government, as well as on the platform and in the press. But I stand here tonight as an Englishman, and say that at this moment I have no cause to be ashamed of the attitude of my country. Two governments in succession, Tory and Liberal, through Lord Stanley and Clarendon, have admitted (as Mr. Fish states himself) in his last despatch on the subject, "that the principle of non-compulsory arbitration is in all questions between the governments of this island that a nation can do. England is ready to have this case and its bearings referred to impartial arbitration, and to pay whatever damages may be assessed against her without a murmur. She has also agreed (and again I use the language of Mr. Fish) "to discuss the important changes in the rules of public law, the desirableness of which has been demonstrated by the incidents of the last few years, and which, in view of the maritime prominence of Great Britain and the United States, it would be right then to mature and propose to the great states of Christendom." She has in fact surrendered her position as invulnerable, and agreed to the terms proposed by your own government. What more can you ask of a nation of your own blood, as proud and sensitive as yourselves on all points where national honor is in question?

But here I must remind you of one fact which you seem never to have realized. The Alabama was the only one of the rebel cruisers of whose character our government had any notice, which escaped from our harbors. The Shenandoah was a merchant vessel, employed in the Indian trade as the Sea King. Her conversion into a rebel cruiser was never heard of till long after she had left England. The Georgia was actually reported by the surveyor of the board of trade as a merchant ship, and to be

rather crank. She was fitted out on the French coast, and left the port of Cherbourg for her first cruise. The Florida was fitted out in Mobile. She was actually detained at the admiralty court, and only discharged by the court on the failure of evidence. On the other hand, our government stopped the Rappahannock, the Alexandra, and the Pampero, and seized Mr. Land's celebrated rams at Liverpool, and Captain Osborn's Chinese flotilla, for which last exercise of vigilance the nation had to pay \$160,000.

"Such is our case as to the cruisers which did you so much damage. I believe it to be true. If we are mistaken, however, you will get such damages for each and all of these vessels as the arbitrator may award. We reserve nothing. I as an Englishman am deeply grieved that any of my countrymen, for base love of gain or any other motive, should have dared to defy the proclamation of my Sovereign, speaking in the nation's name. I earnestly long for the time when by wise consultation between our nations, and the modification of the public law governing on such cases, not only such acts as these, but all wars of sea, and land, may be suppressed. The United States and England have only to agree in this matter, and there is an end of naval war through the whole world.

THE CRISIS IN 1863.

In 1863, the horizon was still dark. Splendid as your efforts had been, and magnificent was the attitude of your nation tried in the few nations have been of all history, those efforts had not yet been crowned with any marked success. With us it was the darkest in the whole long agony, for in the midst of the crisis of that attempt of the Emperor of the French to inveigle us in a joint recognition of the Confederacy, on the success of which his Mexican adventure was supposed to hang. The details of those negotiations, that have never been made public. All we know is, that Mr. Lauday and Mr. Roebuck went to Paris, and had long conferences with the Emperor, the result of which was the effort of Mr. Roebuck (now in turn the representative of the rebels in our Parliament) to force or persuade our government into this alliance. Then came the final crisis. On the 30th of June, 1863, a day memorable in our history as in yours, at the very time that your army of the Potomac was hurrying through the streets of Gettysburg to meet the swoop of those terrible southern legions, John Bright stood on the floor of our House of Commons, on the right with that righteous wrath of his, thus denouncing the Emperor, and the other English orators. He dragged the whole plot to light, quoted the former attacks of Mr. Roebuck on his imperial host, and then turning to the speaker, went on, "And now, sir, the honorable and learned gentleman has been to Paris, introduced there by the honorable member for Sunderland, and he has sought to become, as it were, a co-conspirator with the French Emperor, to drag this country into a policy which I maintain is as hostile to its interests as it would be degrading to its honor." From that moment the cause of the rebellion was lost in England, and the cause of the Emperor was lost in England, and the light and the melting away of Longstreet's corps in the final and desperate efforts to break the federal line on the slopes of Little Round Top. A few weeks more and we heard of the surrender of Vicksburg, and no more was heard in our Parliament of recognition or mediation.

AN APPEAL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

I have now, my friends, stated the case between our countries, from an Englishman's point of view, of course, but I hope fairly and temperately. At any rate, I have only spoken of matters within my own personal knowledge, and have only quoted from public records which are as much to every one of you as they are to me. Such being the case, I trust that you will be right or wrong, if wrong at all, from no insular prejudices or national conceits, and you will at any rate think kindly and bear with the errors of one who has always been a

සමස්තයෙන් මෙය—*Englishman's point of view*—

common savior, toward the goal which is set for them in a brighter future.

Shall it be love or hate; John,
It's you that's to decide—
Ain't your bonds held by fate, John,
Like all the world's beside?

So runs the end of the solemn appeal in "Jonathan to John," the poem which suggested the title of this lecture. It comes from one who never deals in wild words. I am proud to be able to call him a very dear and old friend. He is the American writer who did more than any other to teach such of us in the old country as ever learned them at all, the rights and wrongs of this great struggle of yours. Questions asked by such men can never be safely left on one side. Well, then, I say we *have* answered them. We know—no nation, I believe, knows better, or confesses daily with more of awe—that

OUR BONDS ARE HELD BY FATE;

that a strict account of all the mighty talents which have been committed to us will be required of us English, though we do live in a sea fortress, in which the gleam of steel drawn in anger has not been seen for more than a century. We know that we are very far from being what we ought to be; we know that we have great social problems to work out; and, believe me, we have set manfully to work to solve them; problems which go right down amongst the roots of things, and the wrong solution of which may shake the very foundations of society. We have to face them manfully, after the manner of our race, within the four corners of an island not bigger than one of your large States; while you have the vast elbow-room of this wonderful continent, with all its million outlets and opportunities for every human being who is ready to work. Yes, our bonds are indeed held by fate, but we are taking strict account of the number and amount of them, and mean, by God's help, to dishonor none of them when the time comes for taking them up. We reckon, too, some of us, that as years roll on, and you get to understand us better, we may yet hear the words, "Well done, brother," from this side of the Atlantic; and if the strong, old islander who, after all, is your father, should happen some day to want a name on the rock of one of his bills, I, for one, should not wonder to hear that at the time of presentation the name Jonathan is found scrawled across there in very decided characters. For we have answered that second question, too, so far as it lies in our power. It will be love and not hate between the two freest of the great nations of the earth, if our decision can so settle it. There will never be anything but love again, if England has the casting vote. For remember that the force of the decision of your great struggle has not been spent on this continent. Your victory has strengthened the hands and hearts of those who are striving in the cause of government, for the people by the people, in every corner of the Old World. In England the dam that had for so many years held back the free waters burst in the same year that you sheathed your sword, and now your friends there are triumphant and honored; and if those who were your foes ever return to power you will find that the lesson of your war has not been lost on them, in another six years you will have finished the first century of your national life. By that time you will have grown to fifty millions, and will have subdued and settled those vast western regions, which now in the richness of their solitudes, broken only by the pausing of the engine as it passes once a day over some new prairie line, startles the traveller from the Old World. I am only echoing

THE THOUGHTS AND PRAYERS OF MY NATION

In wishing you God-speed in your great mission. When that centenary comes round, I hope, if I live to see the great family of English speaking nations girdling the earth with a circle of free and happy communities, in which the angels' message of peace on earth and good will amongst men may not be still a mockery and delusion. It rests with you to determine whether this shall be so or not. May the God of all the nations of the earth, who has so marvelously prospered you hitherto, and brought you through so great trials, guide you in your decision.

BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER.

WEDNESDAY MORNING, OCT. 12.

AMUSEMENTS THIS DAY AND EVENING.

BOSTON MUSEUM.—"East Lynne." At 2½ and 7½.

BOSTON THEATRE.—Engagement of Mr. and Mrs. Bar-

1870

AS HEWITT MET QUEEN

TELLS OF HIS SECRET MISSION DURING THE CIVIL WAR.

Chamber of Commerce Hears How Victoria Answered a Question Whether Her Government Intend- ed to Recognize Confederacy— The Charter Revision Approved.

There was a large attendance at the monthly meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, which was held at 12.30 o'clock to-day. President Morris K. Jesup was in the chair.

The following resolutions were offered by the executive committee:

Resolved, That the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, at this, its first meeting since the death of the queen, sends warm and fraternal sympathy to the Chamber of Commerce of the city of London, and through it to all who mourn for the good queen and for the ending of the Victorian age.

Resolved, That, as citizens of the United States, we mourn for Queen Victoria as for one who, in high and conspicuous station, proved herself worthy of it by the simplicity and integrity of her life, and who, as queen, showed herself always the true and faithful friend of the United States.

Resolved, That we wish for the new king, Edward VII., that his reign may be as happily distinguished as that which has just closed by the victories of peace, and by the strengthening of the ties that bind together the people of Great Britain and of the United States.

Seth Low moved the passage of the resolutions and delivered an address on the life of the queen.

Abram S. Hewitt followed with an address in which he said that he was intrusted during the civil war with a secret mission to Europe. While there he went to Paris and visited Gen. Dayton, the American minister. Mr. Dayton asked Mr. Hewitt to go to London immediately to see Mr. Adams, the American minister at the British capital, and tell him that there was a report that the Emperor Napoleon had proposed to England that the two nations should recognize the confederacy. Mr. Hewitt found that Mr. Adams had already heard of the report. Mr. Adams sought Lord John Russell and asked him if such a proposition had come from the Emperor of France. His lordship returned an evasive answer. Mr. Adams then sought an audience with the queen. He saw her majesty in the presence of Prince Albert. Mr. Adams told her majesty of the report, and added that such recognition would cause much bloodshed, as the north would fight the whole world rather than give up the union. The queen replied to the minister as follows:

"Give yourself no concern; my government will not recognize the confederacy."

The resolutions were adopted by a rising vote.

Gen. James H. Wilson delivered an address on China, giving an account of the trade facilities which Americans ought to take advantage of.

Silas D. Webb was elected a member of the committee on foreign commerce and the revenue laws in the place of the late Everett Frazar.

J. Edward Simmons submitted the report of the special committee approving the work of the Charter Commission.

LINCOLN'S ELEPHANTS

Few persons, perhaps, know that Abraham Lincoln at one time had a herd of twelve elephants on his hands. He did not exactly have them in his possession, but they were offered to him, and it took all the tact for which he was famous to gracefully decline them.

The letter in which he turned down the proffered gift has only recently come to light, according to a writer in the *Pathfinder*, who relates that the elephants were presented to President Lincoln for the United States government by the King of Siam, as a token of his friendship toward this country. Lincoln's letter to the king was written February 3, and contained this paragraph:

"This government would not hesitate to avail itself of so generous an offer if the object were one which could be made practically useful in the present condition of the United States. Our political jurisdiction, however, does not reach a latitude so low as to favor the multiplication of the elephants."

Lincoln's reference to his lack of jurisdiction over warm latitudes is given point by the fact that the South was not then under Federal control, and illustrates the subtle humor which often characterized his utterances.

DIPLOMAT WAITS WHILE LINCOLN RELIC IS FOUND

By Associated Press to The Patriot
Springfield, Ill., Feb. 17.—Augusto Rosso, Italian Ambassador at Washington, is a diplomat.

He had a chance to prove it at Springfield last week. The State of Illinois was a bit embarrassed for a moment, but before the story leaked out today the diplomacy of Ambassador Rosso had saved the state's face.

In a Lincoln Day address the Ambassador, telling of the affection Italians held for Abraham Lincoln in his lifetime, referred to a stone taken from the wall of Servius Tullius by Romans in 1865 and sent to the American President "that the memory of each of those brave assertors of liberty may be associated."

Asks to See Italy's Gift

Later, he expressed a desire to see the stone, which had been sent to Springfield by an act of Congress in 1870.

Springfield's face suddenly went red. State officers and Lincoln authorities turned the capital upside down looking for the stone. Lincoln shrines were visited. No Ser-

vius Tullius stone was there. Someone remembered seeing it at Lincoln's Tomb years ago. Another recalled that relics had been taken from the tomb during its reconstruction in 1930 and lodged in a warehouse.

Records were checked and the name of a warehouse patronized by the state at that time was located.

Found in Warehouse

An agitated committee hurried to the warehouse, dug around in dark corners, found the Italian stone and took it to the Governor's manse. There it was placed in a conspicuous position.

Later, Governor Horner and the Ambassador, a guest at the Executive Mansion, wandered into the room. There was the stone!

Ambassador Rosso expressed delight that the gift of his countryment has been accorded so prominent a place of honor.

He made no mention of the fact that he had not observed the stone at any Lincoln shrine. Nor did he remark that it hadn't been in the room when he visited it a short time before.

June 2, 1936

LINCOLN AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

Helen Vincent

History
Dr. MacHarg

LINCOLN AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

In order to deal with Lincoln as a foreign diplomat one should first see how his personal makeup lends itself to this duty. It is true that he had had no experience in diplomatic circles, and very little experience in Washington except for the terms he spent in Congress, but his personal makeup made it possible for him to adapt himself to his duties, both national and foreign. Helen Nicalay says of him, "Some men, born with the gift of wit, lack judgment, or persistent energy. Others, dowered with unusual sagacity, are hampered by a cold earnestness which repels confidence. Still others, afflicted with blind unreasoning energy blunder perpetually into destructive acts of courage and daring. Lincoln had these qualities in happy combination: wit to attract and hold men, logical sense and clear vision to plan methodical action; and, best of all, that high courage which, when the golden moment came, inspired him to bold and fearless action, regardless of what others thought and careless of consequences to himself."¹

1. H. Nicalay, Personal Traits of Abraham Lincoln.

Besides these qualities he also had the quality of recognising men of worth and giving them full credit for their judgment and using their judgment tempered with his own to solve a problem. He showed this ability to judge men for their worth, rather than for personal likes and dislikes in choosing his cabinet. He also showed a very good knowledge of diplomacy in choosing men from the border states for some of the Cabinet positions.

To head his Cabinet Lincoln chose William H. Seward who had been his opponent in the nomination for President of the United States. Seward accepted the nomination at first, but later sent the following note to Lincoln:

Washington, March 2, 1861

My dear Sir:--Circumstances which have occurred since I expressed to you in December last my willingness to accept the office of secretary of state seem to me to render it my duty to ask leave to withdraw that consent.

Tendering to you my best wishes for the success of your administration, with my sincere and grateful acknowledgments of all your acts of kindness and confidence towards me, I remain very respectfully and sincerely,

Your obedient servant,

William H. Seward

The Hon. Abraham Lincoln, President-elect.

There seems to be two different views on the question as to why Seward wrote this note declining this very high

position. One view is that when Lincoln was asked by a close friend, who was worrying for fear Blair's name would be crossed off the Cabinet list, if the state would be changed Lincoln replied, "No, --if that state is broken again , it will beat the top." "There can be no doubt that this speech of the President was at once reported to Seward, and that it had much to do with the abrupt manner in which on the second of March he wrote to Mr. Lincoln, thanking him for his kindness and confidence, but declining the office of secretary of state."²

According to Whitney, when Lincoln received the letter he "thought over the situation until Monday, when he came to the conclusion that M . Seward wished to dominate it by having his resignation accepted and then either resuming his place in the Senate of which he could be leader, or gracefully yielding to the public outcry, which he felt sure would follow, thus reentering the council of the president as the master-spirit of the Administration."³

2. Thornton K. Lathrop, William H. Seward,

3. Henry C. Whitney, Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln

position. One view is that when Lincoln was asked by a close friend, who was worrying for fear Blair's name would be crossed off the Cabinet list, if the state would be changed Lincoln replied, "No, --if that state is broken again , it will beat the top." "There can be no doubt that this speech of the President was at once reported to Seward, and that it had much to do with the abrupt manner in which on the second of March he wrote to Mr. Lincoln, thanking him for his kindness and confidence, but declining the office of secretary of state."²

According to Whitney, when Lincoln received the letter he "thought over the situation until Monday, when he came to the conclusion that Mr. Seward wished to dominate it by having his resignation accepted and then either resuming his place in the Senate of which he could be leader, or gracefully yielding to the public outcry, which he felt sure would follow, thus reentering the council of the president as the master-spirit of the Administration."³

2. Thornton K. Lathrop, William H. Seward,

3. Henry C. Whitney, Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln

It is highly possible that the first reason brought to a head the later reason which Lincoln divined, at any rate the President realised that Seward could not be spared as secretary of state and he added that he "could not afford to let Seward taken the first trick." He wrote the following letter to Seward.

Executive Mansion, March 4, 1861

"My dear Sir:

Your note of the second instant, asking to withdraw your acceptance of my invitation to take charge of the State department, was duly received. It is the subject of the most painful solicitude with me; and I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should; and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction. Please consider and answer by 9:00 a.m. tomorrow.

Your obedient servant,

A. Lincoln."

After a confidential visit, Seward wrote the following letter.

March 5, 1861

"My dear Sir:

Deferring to your opinions and wishes as expressed in your letter of yesterday, and in our conversation of the last evening, I withdraw my letter to you of the second instant, and remain, with great respect and esteem,

Your most obedient servant,

William H. Seward."

Lincoln a letter which he entitled "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, April 1, 1861." "The document, after declaring that the administration, at the end of the first month, was 'without a policy, domestic or foreign, presented 'thoughts' that might serve for both as 'the policy at home,' it set forth that the horde of applicants for local offices should be disposed of, without delay; that the issue before the country should be changed from a question of slavery to one of Union; and that Sumter should be evacuated, but all other Federal points in the South defended. The "Thoughts" headed "For Foreign Nations" were vigorous indeed. Explanations were to be required from Spain, France, Great Britain and Russia, which all seemed to contemplate interference in foreign affairs. If the two first named governments, more aggressive than the others, did not return satisfactory answers, Congress was to be convened, and war was to be declared against them. A spirit of antagonism against European intervention was, at the same time, to be aroused in Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the continent, generally. "But whatever policy we adopt "read the concluding 'Thoughts' "there must be an energetic prosecution of it. For this purpose, it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it, incessantly. Either the President must do it

or desolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agreed abide. It is not in my especial providence; but I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility."⁴

Lincoln was very tactful about these "Thoughts" and instead of publishing them or upbraiding Seward he quietly put them away and answered him in the following manner on April 1. "(To Secretary Seward. "Since parting with you I have been considering your paper dated this day, and entitled "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration." The first proposition in it is, "First, we are at the end of a month's administration and yet without a policy either domestic or foreign."

At the beginning of that month, in the Inaugural, I said: "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government and to collect the duties and imposts." This had your distinct approval at that time; and taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.

4. Alonzo Rothschild, Lincoln, Master of Men.

Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or a party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.

The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers and the like and in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we have no foreign policy.

Upon your closing propositions--that "whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it." For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly. " Either the President must do it himself and be all the while active in it, or "devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide." I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of it being changed without good reason, no continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of the Cabinet."⁵

In this manner Lincoln clearly showed Seward that

5. Autobiography of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 235-6, Nathan W. Stevenson

he was capable of taking care of the affairs of the country and he also showed his diplomatic qualities in being able to calm the anger which would only be natural to a person and thus put Seward in his place, still keeping on good terms with the Secretary of State whose advice he clearly needed. In one of Seward's letters to his wife he shows that he recognized Lincoln's greatness for he said: "Executive skill and vigor are rare qualities. The President is the best of us."⁶ Thus Lincoln was established as the head of the nation. And Lincoln chose as his foreign ministers very able men. Charles Francis Adams was sent to the Court of St. James. He was a particularly able man and had his heritage a father and grandfather, both of whom had been presidents of the United States. William L. Dayton also an able man was sent to the French court which was under Louis Napoleon.

Lincoln had grave problems which were evolved by the war, not only did he have the military side of the question to watch, but also the trend of European nations in their attitude toward the United States and the Confederacy. Before the actual declaration of war, it

6. Rothschild, op. cit., p. 148.

was felt that England and France would be as a whole freindly to the north because of trade and do to the fact that the liberals were in power and were for freedom of races. The South however had extreme confidence in the fact that the countries needed cotton and if any hardships were caused the laboring classes they would cause great fuss. At the opening of the war however, the nations showed a great favoritism for the South, whether it was due to the fact that they would like to see a demoncratic nation break up, the need of cotton, or due to the proclamation that had been passed around during Buchanan's administration saying that nothing could be done about seceding states as they were in the right. At any rate, preference was certainly shown to the south. The north feared that the nations would recognise the South as a belligerent. The South had sent men to these countries but the North still felt they had the good will of the nation.

In England Lord John Russell assured our government that nothing would be done until the arrival of our minister, Charles Francis Adams; with this the Southerners went to work and told England that it was not on the question of slavery that the South seceded but because the North insisted on a protective tariff which hindered

their trade. The North however still did not worry about this.

However, on the day that Adams arrived in England the Queen's proclamation was sent which told her subjects that they should observe strict neutrality in the war existing between the northern and southern states. While Adams was aboard statements had been made recognising the South as a belligerent nation. Upon hearing of this Seward immediately wrote a very fiery dispatch which was to be read to the British Secretary. Lincoln, however, crossed out the most offending parts and had it sent to Mr. Adams instead, thus keeping the nations on good terms, while undoubtedly the other dispatch would have caused war. The letter with Lincoln's corrections follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, May 21, 1861.

Sir:

Mr. Dallas in a brief dispatch of May 2d (No. 333) tells us that Lord John Russell recently requested an interview with him on account of the solicitude which His Lordship felt concerning the effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the President. In that conversation the British secretary told Mr. Dallas that the three representatives of the Southern Confederacy were then in London, that Lord John Russell had not yet seen them, but that he was not unwilling to see them unofficially. He farther informed Mr. Dallas that an understand-

ing exists between the British and French governments which would lead both to take one and the same course as to recognition. His Lordship then referred to the rumor of a meditated blockade by us of Southern ports, and a discontinuance of the same ports of entry. Mr. Dallas answered that he knew nothing on these topics and therefore could say nothing. He added that you were expected to arrive in two weeks. Upon this statement Lord John Russell acquiesced in the expediency of waiting for the full knowledge you were expected to bring.

Mr. Dallas transmitted to us some newspaper reports of Ministerial explanations made in Parliament.

You will base no proceedings on parliamentary debates farther than to seek explanations when necessary and communicate them to this Department (We intend to have a clear and simple record of whatever issue may arise between us and Great Britain.) Leave out.

The President (is surprised and grieved) regrets that Mr. Dallas did not protest against the proposed unofficial intercourse between the British Government and the missionaries of the insurgents (as well as against the demand for explanations made by the British government). It is due however to Mr. Dallas that our instructions had been given only to you and not to him, and that his loyalty and fidelity, too rare in these times (among our late representatives abroad are confessed and), are appreciated. Leave out because it does not appear that such explanations were demanded.

Intercourse of any kind with the so called Commissioners is liable to be construed as a recognition of the authority which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none the less (wrongful) hurtful to us for being called unofficial, and it might be even more injurious, because we should have no means of knowing what points might be resolved by it. Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless, if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse and direct recognition. It is left doubtful here whether the proposed unofficial intercourse has yet actually begun. Your own (present) antecedent instructions are deemed explicit

enough and it is hoped that you have not misunderstood them. You will in any event desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official with the British government, so long as it shall continue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of this country, (confining yourself simply to a delivery of a copy of this paper to the Secretary of State. After doing this) When intercourse shall have been arrested for this cause you will communicate with this department and receive farther directions. Leave out.

Lord John Russell has informed us of an understanding between the British and French governments that they will act together in regard to our affairs. This communication however loses something of its value from the circumstance that the communication was withheld until after knowledge of the fact had been acquired by us from other sources. We know also another fact that has not yet been officially communicated to us, namely, that other European states are apprized by France and England of their agreement and are expected to concur with or follow them in whatever measures they adopt on the subject of recognition. The United States have been impartial and just in all their conduct toward the several nations of Europe. They will not complain however of the combination now announced by the two leading powers, although they think they had a right to expect a more independent if not a more friendly course from each of them. You will take no notice of that or any other alliance. Whenever the European governments shall see fit to communicate directly with us we shall be as heretofore frank and explicit in our reply.

As to the blockade, you will say that by (the) our own laws (of nature) and the laws of nature and the laws of nations this government has a clear right to suppress insurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which have been seized by the insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is the proper means to that end. You will (admit) not insist that our blockade is (not) to be respected if it be not maintained by a competent force--but passing by that question as not now a practical or at least an urgent one you will add that (it) the blockade is now and it will continue to be so maintained, and therefore we expect it

to be respected by Great Britain. You will add that we have already revoked the exequatur of a Russian Consul who had enlisted in the Military service of the insurgents, and we shall dismiss or demand the recall of every foreign agent, Consular or Diplomatic, who shall either disobey the Federal laws or disown the Federal authority.

As to the recognition of the so-called Southern Confederacy it is not to be made a subject of technical definition. It is of course (quasi) direct recognition to publish an acknowledgment of the sovereignty and independence of a new power. It is (quasi) direct recognition to receive its ambassadors, Ministers, agents, or commissioners officially. A concession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed as a recognition of them. No one of these proceedings will (be borne) pass (unnoticed) unquestioned by the United States in this case.

Hitherto recognition has been moved only on the assumption that the so-called Confederate States are de facto a self-sustaining power. Now after long forbearance, designed to soothe discontent and avert the need of civil war the land and naval forces of the United States have been put in motion to repress the insurrection. The true character of the pretended new States is at once revealed. It is seen to be a Power existing in pronouncement only. It has never won a field. It has obtained no forts that were not virtually betrayed into its hands or seized in breach of trust. It commands not a single port on the coast nor any highway out from its pretended Capital by land. Under these circumstances Great Britain is called upon to intervene and give it body and independence by resisting our measures of suppression. British recognition would be British intervention to create within our own territory a hostile state by overthrowing this Republic itself. (When this act of intervention is distinctly performed, we from that hour shall cease to be friends and become once more, as we have twice before been forced to be, enemies of Great Britain). leave out

As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent service, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. We treat them as pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed by our citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If Great Britain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents

and give them shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the laws of nations afford an adequate and proper remedy, (and we shall avail ourselves of it. And while you need not to say this in advance, be sure that you say nothing inconsistent with it.)

Happily, however, Her Britannic Majesty's government can avoid all these difficulties. It invited us in 1856 to accede to the declaration of the Congress of Paris, of which body Great Britain was herself a member, abolishing privateering everywhere in all cases and forever. You already have our authority to propose to her our accession to that declaration. If she refuses to receive it, it can only be because she is willing to become the patron of privateering when aimed at our devastation.

These positions are not elaborately defended now, because to vindicate them would imply a possibility of our waiving them.

We are not insensible of the grave importance of this occasion. We see how, upon the result of the debate in which we are engaged, a line to the war may ensue between the United States, and one, two, or even more European nations. War in any case is as exceptionable from the habits as it is revolting from the sentiments of the American people. But if it come it will be fully seen that it results from the action of Great Britain, not our own, that Great Britain will have decided to fraternize with our domestic enemy, either without waiting to hear from you our remonstrances, and our warnings, or after having heard them. War in defense of national life is not immoral, and war in defense of independence is an inevitable part of the discipline of nations.

Drop all from this end, and in lieu of it write, "This paper is for your own guidance only, and not (sic) to be read or shown to anyone."

The dispute will be between the European and the American branches of the British race. All who belong to that race will especially deprecate it, as they ought. It may well be believe that men of every race and kindred will deprecate it. A war not unlike it between the same parties occurred at the close of the last century. Europe atoned by forty years of suffering for the error that Britain committed in provoking that contest. If that nation shall now repeat the same great error the social convulsions which will follow may not be so long but they will be more general. When they shall have ceased, it will,

we think, be seen, whatever may have been the fortunes of other nations, that it is not the United States that will have come out of them with its precious Constitution altered or its honestly obtained dominion in any degree abridged. Great Britain has but to wait a few months and all her present inconveniences will cease with all our own troubles. If she take a different course she will calculate for herself the ultimate as well as the immediate consequences, and will consider what position she will hold when she shall have forever lost the sympathies and the affections of the only nation on whose sympathies and affections she has a natural claim. In making that calculation she will do well to remember that in the controversy she proposes to open we shall be actuated by neither pride, nor passion, nor cupidity, nor ambition; but we shall stand simply on the principle of self preservation, and that our case will involve the independence of nations, and the rights of human nature.

I am, Sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

W.H.S."⁷

In this manner we see that Lincoln's foresight and modifying power, aided the country a great deal in a foreign crisis.

Another problem which the Union faced was the possible intervention by foreign nations, for they learned from Russia that France wanted Russia and England to join in with them in a concert in their actions against this country. Thus we faced a grave danger of combined intervention.

The next act that the U.S. went into was to sign the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which the powers of Europe had

7. Nicolay and Hay, IV, pp. 220-275.

signed. The treaty included "that privateering should be abolished and that both enemy's property not contraband of war, on board a neutral vessel and neutral property, should be exempt from capture and condemnation as prize."⁸

The United States had not signed before but now wished to do so because of the war. In July Adams was told that the queen would agree to it as soon as the French had agreed to it. All in all it ended in the fact that neither nation wanted to do anything that would harm the South, or the French and English privateers which had been hired by Jefferson Davis.

Another thing that almost caused war between the U.S. and England was the famous Trent affair. The South had won some very spectacular battles and Davis realizing that this was of great interest to the English and French, he decided it would be a good time to send ministers abroad and thus establish the southern states as an independent nation, The Confederacy. James M. Mason of Virginia was to be sent to England and John Slidell of Virginia was to be sent to France. In October they ran the blockade at Charleston in the *Theodora*, and went to Havana and embarked on a British ship, the *Trent*. Captain Charles Wilkes, in command of the Union ship, *San Jacinto*, boarded the boat and removed the two men, sending the others on their way.

8. Lolbrog, William H. Seward, p. 311.

This act aroused great indignation in England for they felt that the British honor and flag had been insulted. In the United States, however, Wilkes was lauded as a hero and given medals. The Cabinet felt that this act was serious. Lincoln felt that the act which was unauthorized and was wrong by the law of the nations might cause very serious trouble with England. So a message was sent on Nov. 30 to Adams saying that Wilkes had not acted under official orders, so we wished to negotiate with England on the subject. Lincoln said on the subject: "I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants. We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. We fought Great Britain for insisting by theory and practice on the right to do exactly what Captain Wilkes has done. If Great Britain shall now protect against the act and demand their release, we must give them up, apologize for the act as a violation of our doctrines and thus forever bend her over to keep peace in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years."⁹ It was indeed a grave situation for if we apologized too much it would appear that the United States was afraid, for it would destroy its prestige abroad and at home and yet without an apology war was inevitable. So on Dec. 26, Sec. Seward gave Lord Lyons the official despatch in which he

9. Stephenson, op. cit.,

stated that Captain Wilkes was doing his duty in acting as he did, but he was wrong in not bringing them into a prize court, so the U.S. could not hold them. Thus a very difficult situation was smoothed over by the secretary and the President, Lincoln. The influence of Mason and Slidell was not great for they were never officially recognised in either of the countries.

In the middle of the summer of 1862, England was suffering a great deal from the lack of cotton. With the starting of Lee's invasions of the north, Lord Russell came to believe that now was the time for an intervention between the North and South for peace: England would recognize the South's independence if the North would not come to terms. However the South's defeats sobered this advocacy and President Lincoln's "Emancipation Proclamation" also won the people who favored liberty over to the North. However one of England's foremost statesmen gave the following opinion of it at New castle on October 7, 1862. "We may have our own opinions about slavery; we may be for or against the South; but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making it appear, a navy; and they have made a nation...We may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern States so far as regards their separation from the North."¹⁰ This speech from a man so far up in the British circles naturally

10. Barton, W.E., President Lincoln, Vol. 2, p. 481.

bothered the United States so Charles Francis Adams went to Lord Russell and was told that Gladstone had been rebuked by the Cabinet and that England would not change her policy. However, England, still aided the south, warships were continually being made in English docks, and being sent under false pretense to Nassau. In February 18, 1862 our ministers complained that a warship was being built for rebel use in Liverpool. This was evaded very nicely by the English, and later in June another was allowed to slip out after complaint by our government. The later was the "Alabama" which was the most notorious and successful of these ships. Gradually this was stopped.

In 1863 Louis Napoleon decided to make an attempt to mediate between the North and South. So France sent a proposal to the minister for mediation, which suggested a meeting of the government and the rebels. The President instructed his secretary to answer with the following despatch. It is in part:

"This government has not the least thought of relinquishing the trust which has been confided to it by the nation under the most solemn of all political sanctions; and if it had any such thought, it would still have abundant reason to know that peace proposed at the cost of dissolution would be immediately, unreservedly, and indignantly rejected by the American people. It is a

great mistake that European statesmen make, if they suppose this people are demoralized. Whatever, in the case of an insurrection, the people of France or of Great Britain or of Switzerland, or of the Netherlands would do to save their national existence, no matter how the strife might be regarded by or might affect foreign nations, just so much and certainly no less, the people of the United States will do, if necessary to save for the common benefit the region which is bounded by the Pacific and Atlantic Coasts, and by the shores of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Mexico, together with the free and Common navigation of the Rio Grande, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, St. Lawrence, Hudson, Delaware, Potomac and other natural highways by which this land, which to them is at once a land of inheritance and a land of promise, is opened and watered. Even if the agents of the American people now exercising their power should, through fear or faction, fall below this height of the national virtue, they would be speedily, yet constitutionally, replaced by others of sterner character and patriotism."¹¹

With this letter, Lincoln stooped all foreign intervention into our affairs and was greatly admired for his dignity and spirit with which the administration bore itself in this time of stress. "The unostentatious dignity, unyielding firmness, and delicate tact displayed

11. Whitney, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

secured the approval of nations and commanded the respect of the civilised world."¹²

However France again interfered with the United States but in a different manner. France overthrew the government in Mexico and set Maximillian up as its head. This violated greatly the Monroe Doctrine, but we could not intervene because of our own civil strife. In the assertion to them the United States stated that they did not believe in foreign intervention but that the government knew that the Mexicans did not want a European monarchy and should therefore guide themselves accordingly, or their might be a clash with American nations. This problem, however, worked itself out for Maximillian was assassinated after the departure of French troops.

Lincoln's good choice in heads of his state department and foreign department, his ability to rule over his Cabinet, his ability to see the delicacy of a situation and to guide himself and his nation accordingly, and his success in keeping us out of war with foreign nations, all of these things seem to point out Lincoln's ability as a diplomat. Seward's greatness as secretary of state is of course recognised but Lincoln was the guiding hand and power behind him such as was seen in his revision of the letter to Charles Francis Adams. In his actions he commanded respect and admiration from foreign nations which he had

12. Ibid., p. 60.

lacked at the beginning of his career. From all these facts I think one can truly say that Lincoln was a good foreign diplomat for he could subordinate his feelings and those of the nation to see the feelings of other nations, and thus keep us out of foreign entanglements. The Trent affair was an example of this, for public opinion was for the keeping of Mason and Slidell, but Lincoln could see the English viewpoint, and also the consequences, so national pride was swallowed, but in such a way that we kept up a good front and thus he averted a serious foreign entanglement.

Bibliography

A Cycle of Adams Tilters, Vols. I,II

Barton, William E., President Lincoln, Vols. I,II

Lathrop, T.K., William H. Seward.

Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln.

Rothschild, Alonza, Lincoln, Master of Men

Stephenson, N.W. An autobiography of Abraham Lincoln.

Whitney, Henry C., Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln, Life, II

FOREIGN POWERS RAISED THREAT TO PARTITION AMERICA IN 1862

Fiery Speech by Gladstone Served as Blunder Which Upset the Scheme—
Public Opinion in England Rallied to Support of the Northern States After
Statesman "Let Cat Out of the Bag."

RECENT events in Europe have made the dismemberment of nations a familiar fact of world history. Americans in 1938 read of the partition of Czechoslovakia, speculate on the fate of other small Central European nations threatened by Nazi Germany, recall the changing of boundaries by the powers that dictated the Treaty of Versailles after the World war. With some reason, Americans are inclined to regard the business of carving up the territory of a neighboring state as a peculiarly foreign affair. They have forgotten the time when this country was the intended victim of partition, directed by European powers in the interest of general "appeasement."

In the early fall of 1862 the British ministry, headed by Viscount Palmerston, was on the eve of intervention in America's domestic quarrel, then in the process of settlement by the arbitrament of arms. British statesmen counted on the co-operation of France, then ruled by Napoleon III; and Russia, they believed, might join in the enterprise. They felt that mere display of overwhelming forces might suffice, and that, if not, it would be "just too bad" for the resisting nation.

Then, as now, the stated primary motive of the scheme was the desire to avoid the horror,

the operatives there, and among other classes throughout the kingdom who were indirectly affected. British commercial interests and those of Europe in general were suffering, all from the same cause, the war in America.

FRENCH ACTION IN MEXICO.

The emperor of the French, who long had been urging upon Britain joint intervention with France in American affairs, had taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by the embarrassment of the United States, due to the Civil war, to set up Maximilian as emperor of Mexico in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine. Already Marshal Bazaine, with a French army at his back, had conquered Mexico in preparation for the installation of Maximilian, who was destined to die bravely before the firing squad of Queretaro, and the theatrical nephew of Bonaparte was negotiating anxiously for the powerful aid of Great Britain, to be indirectly given him through intervention in favor of the Southern Confederacy; and Great Britain was on the verge of giving that aid.

Prime Minister Palmerston wrote to Earl Russell, secretary of state for foreign affairs, proposing that a note be addressed to the contending parties in America, recommending that the conflict between them be ended. To that communication Earl Russell replied:

I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States government, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I

agree further that in case of failure we ought ourselves to recognize the southern states as an independent state.

Within less than a week he again wrote:

As to the time of making the offer, if France and Russia agree, and France, we know, is quite ready, and only waiting our concurrence, events may be taking place which might render desirable that the offer should be made before the middle of October.

Palmerston and Russell composed and sent to their associates in the cabinet a confidential circular laying the ground for the proposed intervention. The circular appointed October 23 as the date for the meeting of the cabinet. What happened to prevent the fateful action there intended to be taken?

Americans long supposed that Queen Victoria had used her influence to defeat the scheme, but such was not the case. Her majesty, in deepest grief over the recent death of her husband, had gone, by advice of her physicians, to Gotha, Germany, where she remained, constantly attended by some one of her ministers, but taking no interest in affairs of state.

BLUNDER BY GLADSTONE.

That which may have changed the course of world history was a blunder committed by a relatively young English statesman, which in later years was characterized by himself as "incredibly gross," a blunder that at the time promised to affect only his personal fortunes. William Ewart Gladstone, subsequently to be known and honored in America and throughout the world as "The Grand



VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, PRIME MINISTER OF ENGLAND WHEN FOREIGN POWERS THREATENED TO INTERCEDE ON THE SIDE OF THE CONFEDERACY.

bloodshed and destruction of war, but there were other considerations which more nearly concerned the immediate parties to the proceeding.

Europe's supply of cotton had been rendered meager by the Union blockade of southern ports, out of which had been coming the world's supply of that staple. Many spindles in the textile establishments of Manchester were idle, and there was much distress among

Old Man," eulogist of the Constitution of the United States, unwittingly did that which with strange irony defeated the entire scheme, although he was its earnest advocate.

In a political speech given at Newcastle-on-Trent, just sixteen days before the date set for the cabinet meeting, Mr. Gladstone, then chancellor of the exchequer, uttered, in the most radical form, the views which Lord Palmerston and Russell had more cautiously expressed in their correspondence with one another. The orator shook his finger at the people of the northern states. Theirs was the responsibility, he admonished, for continuing what he described as the bloody and hopeless effort to subjugate the South. The sanguinary and futile war, he asserted, was bringing misery on the Northerners themselves, to say nothing of their adversaries and the remainder of the world. Jefferson Davis had "made a nation," and it was as certain "as any event yet future and contingent could be," that the Confederate states would achieve their independence, and that "the American Union would be dissolved." The nation which Mr. Davis had created must be recognized by Great Britain, and the United States must be advised to join in that recognition. It was evident that Mr. Gladstone believed that Britain should proceed without regard to consequences.

Charles Francis Adams, United States minister to Great Britain, almost despaired when he read Mr. Gladstone's speech. Referring to Gladstone, he wrote in his diary:

If he be any exponent at all of the views of the cabinet, then my term is likely to be very short; for the animus as respects Mr. Davis and the rebel cause is very apparent.

The meditation of those things sensibly depresses my spirits. We are now at the very crisis of our fate.

The outlook for the Union cause was indeed dark. The forces of the Union had achieved some notable successes, but campaigns had ended in bloody failure, and the outcome of the war was in doubt. Vicksburg, Gettysburg, Grant's campaigns in Virginia and Sherman's march to the sea were yet in the future. If two or more of the most powerful nations in Europe took sides with the South, of what avail would have been all the pouring out of blood for preservation of the Union? Invasions from Canada by the British and from Mexico by the French were in prospect; and Russia, coming down our western coast, might invade California. The blockade would be raised. Powerful navies would combine against the Union's outnumbered vessels of war.

OPPORTUNITY IS MISSED.

What happened was this: Mr. Gladstone had "let the cat out of the bag." The "elder statesmen," Palmerston and Russell, each of whom was around 70 years old, were incensed at the younger cabinet member's violation of the unwritten law of ministerial government. He must be disciplined.

Palmerston wrote to Sir George Cornewall Lewis, a member of the cabinet and chief among Gladstone's younger political rivals, that he, Lewis, must apply the lash to the imprudent Gladstone on the hustings.

If Lewis would not undertake the castigation, he, the prime minister, must do so. Lewis, nothing loathe, assumed the duty.

It was deemed necessary by Lord Palmerston, that Lewis should deny that the government was about to intervene in the American embroilment; and during the delay which that necessity imposed, opportunity went its way, and the fateful step was never taken.

News of Lincoln's preliminary proclamation, which gave 100 days' notice of the coming emancipation proclamation, reached England when the excitement over Gladstone's Newcastle speech was at its height. The result was an immediate and mighty swing of middle class opinion in favor of the North. The great English publicist John Bright, who from the beginning had ardently opposed recognition of the Confederacy, wrote his American correspondent, Cyrus W. Field, in February: "Opinion here has greatly changed. In almost every town great meetings are being held to pass resolutions in favor of the North."

There had been an abrupt shift of opinion among British factory hands before the more general change noted by Bright. Henry Ward Beecher, happening to be in England, was induced, by friends of the Union there, to give several public speeches for the Union cause. In Manchester, he obtained, by his coolness and address, a hearing against fiercest opposition. When the uproar that greeted his appearance had subsided for want of breath, he said simply: "Now you had your turn, let me have mine." British sense of fair play prevailed, and while viscounts and earls in the cabinet clung to their failing scheme, those half-starved factory workers, convinced by the American clergyman that the North was fighting the battle of free labor, tightened their belts and stood by the Union cause.

BOLD COURSE OF LINCOLN.

Before the delivery of Mr. Gladstone's revealing speech, Mr. Adams had discovered enough to convince him that intervention by Britain and France, and perhaps Russia, was imminent; and that the first step would be a communication addressed to himself. In that belief he wrote to his government for instructions.

The President could not know that the execution of the scheme would be postponed and never renewed. All his information pointed to what in effect would be an ultimatum, issued by two or more of the great powers demanding cessation of the war and dissolution of the Union. Lincoln's reaction stirs the blood. At his direction, Mr. Seward, secretary of state, wrote from Washington to the American minister in England:

"If the British government shall in any way approach you directly or indirectly with propositions which assume or contemplate an appeal to the President on the subject of our internal affairs, whether it seem to imply a purpose to dictate, or to mediate, or to advise or even solicit, or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit any communication of the kind. You will make the same answer whether the proposition comes from the British government alone or from that government in combination with any other power."

In conclusion the secretary wrote:

"I have now in behalf of the United States and by the authority of their chief executive magistrate performed an important duty. The possible consequences have been weighed and its solemnity is therefore felt and freely acknowledged. This duty has brought us to meet and confront the danger of a war with Great Britain and other states allied with the insurgents who are in arms for the overthrow of the American union. You will perceive that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis with the caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us."

W. F. SPOTTSWOOD.

Russian Visit 80 Years Ago

HARPER'S WEEKLY.


JOURNAL OF CIVILIZATION

Vol. VII.—No. 355.]

NEW YORK, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1863.

[SPECIAL POSTER SIX CENTS
\$2.00 PER YEAR IN ADVANCE]

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the Year 1863, by Harper & Brothers, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.



RECEPTION OF THE COMMON COUNCIL COMMITTEE

ADMIRAL LISOVSKI ON BOARD THE FLAGSHIP "ALEXANDER NEVSKI" (SEE PAGE 602)

A vivid page from the past. Harper's Weekly thus recorded the reception tendered by New York councilmen to Admiral Lisovski, aboard the flagship Alexander Nevski, on the Russian fleet's friendly visit to U.S. shores in 1863.

(Story in adjacent column.)

Russia Was On Our Side In '63, Too

BY FRANK L. HAYES.

A demonstration of Russo-American friendship has flashed like lightning across the sky, electrifying the world and charging the defenders of the American union with new energy—that is being said now as a result of the Moscow declarations. It was fully as true after the Russian fleet arrived in New York harbor in September, 1863, dispelling clouds of gloom and anxiety. But that affair was more unexpected.

There were good reasons why Americans would not have expected a friendly visit from the Russian fleet at that time. Other powers might have taken it amiss, and the Russian ambassador was almost in panic at the possibility.

Besides, then as now, though American and Russia liked each other as individuals, trusted and valued each other as powers, they each detested the other's political systems. Americans wanted no part of czarism; the czars regarded republics as subversive, and a menace unless they were far away.

Czar Looks to Lincoln.

Yet early in 1863 it must have dawned on Czar Alexander II that he and the railsplitter in the White House had something in common. The day Lincoln took oath to defend the Constitution, Alexander was proclaiming the liberation of the Russian serfs. And now Lincoln proclaimed the freedom of the slaves in America.

The blue-blooded despot took good note of that point in common, for just then Russia needed friends. The Poles were in revolt; Britain, France and Russia were writing him threatening letters; Napoleon III was intriguing; war seemed imminent. And Russia's Atlantic fleet could be easily bottled up by England's navy as long as it remained at home on the defensive.

One by one, then, under secret sailing orders, communicating in code, provisioned for two years, the vessels of the little old fleet slipped away, destination unknown.

Fleet Becomes a Threat.

Also one by one they luffed into New York harbor. In September the whole fleet was arrayed in the harbor, under Rear Adm. Lisovski's command: three frigates, three clippers and two corvettes. It had been a small fleet at home, but in this harbor, from which it could dart forth to harass enemy shipping, it was a threat which would make the powers think twice before starting a war on either Russia or its host. This is what the Russians had counted on.

They had also counted on a welcome from America, but probably they never anticipated its

Russian Visit 80 Years Ago

HARPER'S WEEKLY


JOURNAL OF CIVILIZATION

Vol. VII.—No. 355.]

NEW YORK, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1863.

[SINGLE COPIES SIX CENTS
\$2.00 PER YEAR IN ADVANCE]

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the Year 1863, by Harper & Brothers, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New York.



RECEPTION OF THE COMMON COUNCIL COMMITTEE

ADMIRAL LISOVSKI ON BOARD THE FLAGSHIP ALEXANDER NEVSKI (SEE PAGE 62)

A vivid page from the past. Harper's Weekly thus recorded the reception tendered by New York councilmen to Admiral Lisovski, aboard the flagship Alexander Nevski, on the Russian fleet's friendly visit to U.S. shores in 1863.

(Story in adjacent column.)

Russia Was On Our Side In '63, Too

BY FRANK L. HAYES.

A demonstration of Russo-American friendship has flashed like lightning across the sky, electrifying the world and charging the defenders of the American union with new energy—that is being said now as a result of the Moscow declarations. It was fully as true after the Russian fleet arrived in New York harbor in September, 1863, dispelling clouds of gloom and anxiety. But that affair was more unexpected.

There were good reasons why Americans would not have expected a friendly visit from the Russian fleet at that time. Other powers might have taken it amiss, and the Russian ambassador was almost in panic at the possibility.

Besides, then as now, though American and Russia liked each other as individuals, trusted and valued each other as powers, they each detested the other's political systems. Americans wanted no part of czarism; the czars regarded republics as subversive, and a menace unless they were far away.

Czar Looks to Lincoln.

Yet early in 1863 it must have dawned on Czar Alexander II that he and the railsplitter in the White House had something in common. The day Lincoln took oath to defend the Constitution, Alexander was proclaiming the liberation of the Russian serfs. And now Lincoln proclaimed the freedom of the slaves in America.

The blue-blooded despot took good note of that point in common, for just then Russia needed friends. The Poles were in revolt; Britain, France and Russia were writing him threatening letters; Napoleon III was intriguing; war seemed imminent. And Russia's Atlantic fleet could be easily bottled up by England's navy as long as it remained at home on the defensive.

One by one, then, under secret sailing orders, communicating in code, provisioned for two years, the vessels of the little old fleet slipped away, destination unknown.

Fleet Becomes a Threat.

Also one by one they luffed into New York harbor. In September the whole fleet was arrayed in the harbor, under Rear Adm. Lisovskii's command; three frigates, three clippers and two corvettes. It had been a small fleet at home, but in this harbor, from which it could dart forth to harass enemy shipping, it was a threat which would make the powers think twice before starting a war on either Russia or its host. This is what the Russians had counted on.

They had also counted on a welcome from America, but probably they never anticipated its

warmth. New York, before they arrived, had been in the depths of discouragement. The North feared active intervention by Britain on the side of the South; France's Napoleon III, scheming patron of the Confederacy, already had possession of Mexico City; in New York itself four days of draft riots had caused 1,000 casualties.

Then the Russians came. The North went wild. Delegations from round about trooped in. There were banquets in the Astor House. Americans cheered the Czar as "emancipator of the serfs and friend of the Union." The Union adherents were convinced, as the Russians were convinced on their own part, that the powers would not intervene now in their affairs.

Russians Proved Friendship.

Recent historians have expanded the point that Russia sent the fleet for its own strategic reasons, not expressly for our comfort. The Russians, these same historians agree, never pretended otherwise. And everybody agrees that the Russians' maneuver strengthened the position of both countries and greatly helped Union morale.

If there were doubt of the genuineness of Russian friendliness on this occasion, that was dispelled by the originator of the plan, Adm. Popov, after he had taken his position in October with the Russian Pacific fleet in San Francisco Bay. Hearing a report that Southern cruisers were about to raid the Bay, he ordered his officers: "If such a corsair puts into port, signal: 'Put on steam and clear for action.' We are bound to assist those who have offered us help."

Reader's Note Book

6/1/45 By Ernest Cady

Lincoln vs. Europe

HAD radio communication existed, or had there even been a cable to Europe in 1862, the American Civil War might have had a different outcome and the subsequent history of the United States and consequently that of the world, have been altered.

For Great Britain, had her ministers learned of the Union disaster at the second battle of Bull Run at the time instead of weeks later, almost certainly would have recognized the Confederacy and ultimately teamed up with France to weaken America and destroy the budding principle of democracy that was the bugbear of Old World conservatives.

This is but one of the little-known facts restated and underlined in a graphic and fascinating new study of Abraham Lincoln's conduct of foreign affairs titled **DIPLOMAT IN CARPET SLIPPERS** (By Jay Monaghan; the Bobbs-Merrill Co.; \$4).

Even Americans who make some study of the Civil War period, not to mention those with only casual interest, are prone to think of it in predominantly domestic terms. The internecine nature of the warfare and the great divide which it constitutes in the over-all history of the Republic make this almost inevitable.

Few remember that concurrent with Lincoln's struggle to save the Union, he carried on a ceaseless battle against foreign intrigue that was as bitter and decisive as the one for which he is best known.

America had friends in the outside world but they were the underdogs—the common people of the European nations whose leaderships, oftener than not, watched our fratricidal strife like vultures, ready to pounce for the kill once they knew the North was done for.

THE main factors on which British and French hostility was based—they were the worst offenders—were the shutting off of the cotton from the South on which their great textile industries depended for raw materials and the fear of the upper classes in both countries that a defeat for the South would be a severe setback to a

culture like their own, and strengthen the rule by "mobocracy" as the crystalizing democratic way of life in the North was called by its foes.

Louis Napoleon, president of France, seized the opportunity to defy the Monroe Doctrine, send an army to Mexico and place the ill-fated Maximilian on the throne as emperor. From this vantage point he awaited the opportunity to strike north on the heels of a Southern victory. Only the unpopularity of slavery as an institution with the English man in the street stayed the hand of England from intervening to force the North to let the South secede.

The United States thus was menaced from the Atlantic, on the high seas and on its own doorstep. To deal with these grave dangers and at the same time to win the all-important war at home was Lincoln's herculean task. And if, as Mr. Monaghan makes clear, he fumbled, experimented and in the end merely muddled through to triumph, as indeed he did in the main task also, it is all the more credit to the Great Emancipator's courage, patience and genuine humility plus the quality which was his forte—to weave error, inspiration, genius and an instinct for the right move at the right time into a finished pattern that in the end achieved the desired result.

THIS is not the first book-length analysis of Lincoln's foreign policy, but it is by far the most lively and readable that I have seen. Mr. Monaghan has chosen to interpret his material almost entirely in terms of personalities. Complete accuracy and exactitude in detail sometimes suffer from this treatment, but the faults are not grave ones. The principal shortcoming is the impression given by the author that the South might have won the war even as late as 1864 given a favorable turn of events in the field or in foreign diplomacy.

The fact is of course that the end of the Confederacy was clearly foreshadowed when Grant's victories on the lower Mississippi split the South; that England saw the handwriting on the wall in the battle of Gettysburg—"the high tide of the Confederacy"—and thereafter lapsed as gracefully as only Britannia can when confronted by the inevitable, into a conciliatory policy.

Mr. Monaghan writes with vigor, humor and clarity. He makes the figures in the mighty drama of 1861-65 alive and vivid as characters in a novel, despite the fact that their story has been told and retold endlessly in the intervening 80 years.

Milburn P. Akers:

Russian Aid to U.S. In Civil War Recalled

RUSSIA, now contemplating the construction of a navy consistent with her position in the Big Three, was once a sea power with sufficient strength to make England think twice, and then stop, in any plans her government might have had to intervene in behalf of the South during the American Civil War.

England, in concert with Napoleon III of France, had done what she could, short-of-war, to aid the Confederacy. Her public men, Gladstone, Earl Russell and Lord Palmerston, frequently ex-

Russia had no textile industry, as did England and France, which were suffering from the Union blockade of the South.

Russia, under Alexander II, was definitely on the road to liberalism, however. That course was interrupted by Alexander's successor who undid many of his reforms.

Despite Russia's assurance, England and France continued their policies of aid short-of-war to the Confederacy, and the likelihood of intervention became ominous.

Then it was that Alexander II sent his navy to America. One fleet, under Adm. Popoff, anchored in San Francisco Bay. The other, commanded by Adm. Lessovsky, visited Boston, Washington, Annapolis, and other Eastern seaports.

Samuel Grafton is on vacation. His column will be resumed on his return.

pressed sympathy with the South, and the policies of their government were friendly with the Confederacy. Privateers were built and outfitted in British yards and then, under the stars and bars, sent to prey on Northern commerce.

Assurances Given Lincoln.

INTERVENTION in America was a leading topic of diplomatic conversation in Europe, so Carl Sandburg, in his monumental biography of Lincoln, states, "Leaders in England and France," he says, "who favored recognition of the Confederacy found Russia a hindrance. Late in '62 a personal letter from President Lincoln was transmitted to the Russian foreign minister, Gorchakov, at St. Petersburg, by Acting American Minister Bayard Taylor. Their conversation was published by order of Congress, though Lincoln's letter to Gorchakov was not made known."

Gorchakov, acting for Alexander II, Russia's "czar liberator" who had freed 23,000,000 serfs, sent these assurances to Lincoln, who feared English and French intervention:

"Russia alone has stood by you from the first, and will continue to stand by you. Proposals will be made to Russia to join in some plan of interference. She will refuse any invitation of the kind. You may rely upon it, she will not change."

In so doing, Russia aligned herself against England and France, who had fought her so recently in the war in the Crimea. Also, if one must seek an economic reason, it can be pointed out that

Cleared for Action.

WHEN Southern privateers were reported near the Golden Gate, Adm. Popoff ordered his ships cleared for action. The privateers did not enter. Meanwhile, Adm. Lessovsky confided in the American admiral, David Farragut, that his orders were to join with the Americans if anticipated happenings came to pass.

England and France did not intervene. Napoleon III, however, sent an army to Mexico with the ill-fated Maximilian. Gladstone, Russell and Palmerston discovered their policies had little support among English working people.

What had worried them primarily was the rise of America as a world factor. It upset the old game of balance of power. Despite their worries and efforts, America emerged from the Civil War a united and greater nation; one that was destined to come to their rescue twice in the next 75 years.

Today, as some persons worry over Russia's rise to world power and concern themselves over her plans to construct a modern and powerful navy, they might recall what Russia once did with her navy when America required her aid.

Discovered by Sept 11, 1915

Chi. Sun
9-26-46

About Your Teeth

Dentist Aided North to Win Civil War

By Dr. Floris van Minden.

THE United States owes much to a famous dentist. His worth to our country has hardly been recognized. Dr. Thomas W. Evans, a Pennsylvania dentist, won a place in history and should be properly accredited and honored for having prevented the recognition of the Confederacy by France during the Civil War.

Dr. Evans was practicing dentistry in Paris when the War Between the States was taking place here. Probably the first American dentist to locate in Paris, he soon had the leading practice there. One of his patients was Emperor Napoleon III, head of the French state. Both men became intimate



Dr. van Minden.

friends. On a visit to his office for dental services, Napoleon surprised Dr. Evans by saying, "It looks like the Confederacy will win the rebellion and I am debating with myself whether to recognize the South or not."

Dr. Evans pleaded with the Emperor not to do so, realizing what such an act would mean to our nation. For if France recognized the Confederacy, Spain would quickly follow and Italy, too, would take a similar stand. Then Germany and England also might have lent their approval.

WITH such a European change, the friendship of Russia for the North would have meant little. The South would have had the sympathy of Europe and been given financial aid that might have won the war.

Napoleon admitted that he based his views on the news reports of the papers and that they pointed to a victory for the Southern cause. Then he added, "I should like very well to know the truth about the situation. I wish I had some trustworthy messenger to send to the United States to investigate!"

Dr. Evans volunteered to go. He left immediately and returned to this country to see President Lin-

coln. Mr. Lincoln made it clear to him that the North would win and furnished sufficient evidence to convince the French monarch. Dr. Evans went back to France and on the strength of his report, France did not recognize the South. The neutrality of France was maintained throughout the war and this had a profound effect upon our relations with the other European countries.

HISTORY also tells how turn about was fair play as Dr. Evans was able to help save the life of Empress Eugenie, the wife of Napoleon III. During the riots following the fall of Sedan at the close of the Franco-Prussia War in 1870, Dr. Evans aided the Empress to escape in disguise to England and thereby prevented her death by violence.

Dr. Evans made a fortune by practicing abroad and he gave much of that money for an excellent cause in this country. He donated about a million and a half dollars for the establishment and maintenance of a dental school in Philadelphia. It now contains his library and museum and is called the Thomas W. Evans Museum and Dental Institute of the School of Dentistry, University of Pennsylvania.

Let us remember that Dr. Evans—a dentist—was responsible to a large extent, for the Northern victory in the War Between the States, and thus influenced the destiny of our nation.

CREDITS LINCOLN WITH WAR BLUFF

Woldman Says He Tricked Europe With Russians

One of the "grandest bluffs in the history of international affairs" to save the United States from European intervention in the Civil War was credited to Abraham Lincoln last night.

Juvenile Judge Albert A. Woldman, author of two books on the Civil War president and a Lincoln authority, speaking at Temple Emanu El, said the bluff involved permission by President Lincoln for extraordinary naval operations by the Russian fleets.

Lincoln, according to the speaker, gave these fleets permission to sail into New York and San Francisco harbors at a time when both France and Great Britain were considering intervention in the war to bring about recognition of the Confederacy as an independent nation.

Sought Neutral Haven

Judge Woldman explained that Lincoln, whose birthday will be observed in ceremonies today, knew the Russian ships were not in our harbors to help the Union cause, but because they sought a neutral haven. Russia had been having trouble with the Poles and England and France were threatening Russia, he said.

In the annual Lincoln Day memorial services, conducted by the Jewish War Veterans of the United States with all veterans' organizations and civic leaders participating, the colors will be raised at 11:45 this morning and a wreath placed on the statue of Lincoln on the Mall.

Morris Morgenstern, chairman of the Lincoln Day memorial committee, will read the Gettysburg Address. Common Pleas Judge Arthur H. Day will speak. In event of bad weather the ceremonies will be held on the ground floor of the Board of Education Building.

County and state offices and state liquor stores will be closed today. Federal and city offices will remain open their usual half day on Saturday.

2-12 55
Charles H. H. H.

LINCOLN AND THE DUTCH

In the April-June, 1954, number of The Historical Review of Berks County, we came upon the following interesting anecdote, told originally in T. Harry Williams' book, *Lincoln and His Generals*.

At the start of the Civil War Lincoln handed out many commissions for political as well as for military reasons. He tried to satisfy Republicans and Democrats, groups that supported the war and those that opposed it, and leaders of important nationality groups. As Williams tells the story, "Lincoln realized the importance of enlisting the Germans in support of the war, but he was amused by their eagerness to get their prominent men on the list of generals. Once a staff officer heard a conversation between the President and the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, about some appointments of brigadier generals. Lincoln said he agreed with most of Stanton's recommendations, but, continued the President, 'there has got to be something done unquestionably in the interest of the Dutch, and to that end I want Schimmelfenning appointed.' Lincoln uttered the name with great enjoyment. Stanton said there were German officers who were better recommended. 'No matter about that,' said Lincoln, 'his name will make up for any difference there may be.'"

Lincoln Day Audience Told Abe Halted Communist Move

SARASOTA — Communists tried to infiltrate the U.S. a hundred years ago and might have made headway had it not been for Abraham Lincoln, a Lincoln Day Dinner audience was told here last night.

Mrs. Elly M. Peterson, assistant chairman of the Republican National Committee, tossed out the point in a rambling address that compared the nation's first Republican President to the first Communist contemporary, Karl Marx.


Mrs. Peterson said the bright star of Lincoln and the bloody star of Marx, the "father of Communism," rose at the same time.

She said Lincoln served his only term in Congress while Marx and his collaborator, Engels, wrote "The Communist Manifesto."

After Lincoln became President, Mrs. Peterson said, a Communist named Sorge "tried in vain upon order of his superior, Engels, to obtain an appointment with Abraham Lincoln."

Communists in London thought Lincoln was a potential leader of the new Revolution, Mrs. Peterson said, "a man of humble origin, without wealth, without education, without capitalist contacts, seemingly tailor-made for their ungodly experiments."

"Had they been correct in their erroneous judgment of our first Republican President, the U.S. and not the USSR, could have been the first Communist nation 100 years ago," she said.



Lincoln Lore

January, 1977

Bulletin of The Lincoln National Life Foundation...Mark E. Neely, Jr., Editor. Published each month by The Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, Fort Wayne, Indiana 46801.

Number 1667

Abraham Lincoln and the Adams Family Myth

Editor's Note: Valuable help in preparing this issue was provided by Dr. Patrick J. Owens, a recent graduate of the University of Notre Dame's history department and a John Quincy Adams scholar. He checked the references to the meeting in the Adams Papers. The Massachusetts Historical Society provided information on the location of microfilm copies of the Adams Papers. The portraits on page 3 are courtesy of the Adams National Historic Site and reproduced from *The Dictionary of American Portraits* (Dover Publications, Inc., 1967). The rest of the photographs are from the files of the Lincoln National Life Foundation.

Viewers of educational television's "Adams Chronicles" have been afforded a rare example of packing as much history into a popular dramatic series as the dramatic structure can bear. Short of having a man standing in front of a blackboard, the old "sunrise semester" format that educational television is trying to get away from, this may well be as much history as one can get from television. The medium makes severe demands on its message; of history, it demands narrative drive and dramatic impact. There is no latitude for a leisurely or painstaking discussion of the merits of various kinds of evidence; the show must go on.

Lincoln students furrowed their brows and shifted uneasily in their chairs during one of the more powerful scenes in the series. Charles Francis Adams, grandson of one President and son of another, had come to Washington to receive his instructions for his mission to England as Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Secretary of State William Seward took him to meet the new President; it would be the only meeting between the Ambassador and Abraham Lincoln. Adams, at his articulately deferential and

solemnly statesmanlike best, thanked the President and expressed his hopes to be able to live up to his important and difficult mission. Lincoln said nothing of the mission and, insultingly, told Adams that he was Seward's man, not Lincoln's, and owed his thanks to the Secretary of State. Lincoln then sat down at his desk, leaned back in his chair, clasped his hands behind his head, and informed Seward that he had just settled the appointment for the Chicago post office! An awkward moment followed, and Lincoln asked whether there was anything else they wanted. With that, the meeting ended.

The great hope of the third Adams political generation thus encountered the new force in American politics, the man of the

people, the man of no breeding. The scene is set for the denouement of the Adams family story: unable or unwilling to play the game of politics by the new rules of mass democracy, the family will be spurned by the America it expects to serve. The logic of Henry Adams's disgust with "Grantism" in politics in the next generation flows naturally from this image; for the Lincolns and Grants of this political world there are no statesmen, only office-seekers.

The makers of the "Adams Chronicles" were not taking license with the written sources; in fact, they followed their source scrupulously. The source is Charles Francis Adams, Junior's biography of his father, *Charles Francis Adams* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1900). The account is worth quoting at length:

Mr. Adams made at the time his own diary record of the single official interview he was ever destined to have with President Lincoln. His half-amused, half-mortified, alto-



FIGURE 1. Charles Francis Adams (1807-1886), the son of John Quincy Adams, spent most of his childhood in Europe and attended English schools for two years. His greatest diplomatic triumph was his prevention of the sale of the Laird rams to the Confederacy.



FIGURE 2. William L. Dayton (1807-1864) was Lincoln's first choice for ambassador to England. He served as ambassador to France until his death in 1864.

gether shocked description of it, given contemporaneously to members of his family was far more graphic. He had been summoned to Washington by the secretary of state to receive his verbal instructions. The country was in the midst of the most dangerous crisis in its history; a crisis in which the action of foreign governments, especially of England, might well be decisive of results. The policy to be pursued was under consideration. It was a grave topic, worthy of thoughtful consideration. Deeply impressed with the responsibility devolved upon him, Mr. Adams went with the new secretary to the State Department, whence, at the suggestion of the latter, they presently walked over to the White House, and were ushered into the room which more than thirty years before Mr. Adams associated most closely with his father, and his father's trained bearing and methodical habits. Presently a door opened, and a tall, large-featured, shabbily dressed man, of uncouth appearance, slouched into the room. His much-kneed, ill-fitting trousers, coarse stockings, and worn slippers at once caught the eye. He seemed generally ill at ease, — in manner, constrained and shy. The secretary introduced the minister to the President, and the appointee of the last proceeded to make the usual conventional remarks, expressive of obligation, and his hope that the confidence implied in the appointment he had received might not prove to have been misplaced. They had all by this time taken chairs; and the tall man listened in silent abstraction. When Mr. Adams had finished, — and he did not take long, — the tall man remarked in an indifferent, careless way that the appointment in question had not been his, but was due to the secre-

tary of state, and that it was to "Governor Seward" rather than to himself that Mr. Adams should express any sense of obligation he might feel; then, stretching out his long legs before him, he said, with an air of great relief as he swung his long arms to his head: — "Well, governor, I've this morning decided that Chicago post-office appointment." Mr. Adams and the nation's foreign policy were dismissed together! Not another reference was made to them. Mr. Lincoln seemed to think that the occasion called for nothing further; as to Mr. Adams, it was a good while before he recovered from his dismay; — he never recovered from his astonishment, nor did the impression then made ever wholly fade from his mind.

Although there were some small differences in detail in the televised version, the "Chronicles" followed the account closely and rendered its spirit nicely enough.

The problem lies in the necessity of simplification for the sake of dramatic impact. Leaving aside the invitation in Charles, Junior's account to compare Charles, Senior's original diary entry with the family tradition, one can say that there are other published sources of information written by members of the Adams family which suggest that the nature of the meeting was somewhat different from the televised version. The most obvious of these lies in Henry Adams's famous autobiography, *The Education of Henry Adams*. Henry was the Ambassador's son too, and he accompanied his father to England as his private secretary. He points out that his father's principal aide, also a political appointee, was useless: "As Secretary of Legation the Executive appointed the editor of a Chicago newspaper who had applied for the Chicago Post-Office; a good fellow, universally known as Charley Wilson, who had not a thought of staying in the post, or of helping the Minister." Much of the succeeding episode in the "Chronicles" was based on *The Education*; yet there was no attempt to pursue this obvious lead. Clearly, the Chicago post office was not something that was totally unrelated to the Adams mission; an applicant for that office was being sent instead to England. Was Lincoln's mention of the Chicago post office a gratuitous slur on Mr. Adams's high office; was it the low preoccupation of a petty politician from the West?

The evidence in Charles Francis Adams's diary seems conclusive. This is the entry for March 28, 1861; Seward was discussing the state of affairs with the new administration after suggesting that they go to see the President without a scheduled appointment:

Not very encouraging I thought. He [Seward] spoke of the President kindly and as coming gradually right, whilst he exposed to me without comment or censure a picture of his own situation — much absorption in the details of office dispensation, but little application to great ideas. The Cabinet without unity, and without confidence in the head or in each other. I must say I can now foresee but one result. He spoke of my appointment as his victory, whilst he made a species of apology for the selection of Mr. Wilson which seemed to me a little lame. Failing to carry his nomination for the post office at Chicago, the President by way of compensation flung him the place of secretary of legation of which the man was innocent of all wish. Mr. Seward could raise no objection to his own friend. I replied that I had no objection to the choice, upon the assurance that he was unobjectionable, which he gave me. After breakfast he proposed to me to go the President's to acknowledge my appointment which I did. We found ourselves in the Cabinet with only Mr. Arnold, the member of the Chicago District of Illinois there. He was evidently grieving at the President's taking out of his hands the choice of the Postmaster of Chicago, and appointing a person he did not like. Soon the President came in. He shook hands with me and said something complimentary, I briefly thanked him for the honor conferred upon me, and expressed the hope not to discredit his selection. In the matter of that, said he, I have no great claim on you, for the selection was mainly Governor Seward's. I replied, admitting my consciousness of the fact, but that without his assent, the act could not have been done. The President then turned to the main idea and announced his decision in the Chicago case. He was about to go on to talk with Governor Seward on other topics without minding me, when the latter gave me a hint, and I respectfully took my leave. Such was his fashion of receiving and



FIGURE 3. The sons of Charles Francis Adams, Charles at top, Henry in the middle, and Brooks at the bottom.

dismissing the incumbent of one of the two highest posts in the foreign service of the country! I left the presence cheerfully enough, and congratulated myself that the task of being in his council had not been laid upon me.

Within the same rough parameters of truth, what a very different image of the meeting this entry presents!

The Chicago post office was not only germane to the conversation, Seward and Adams had themselves been discussing it just before going to meet the President. Lincoln, thinking always in terms of a very young party's unity, had wanted to give the ambassadorships of England and France to William L. Dayton and John C. Frémont, who had been the Republican nominees for Vice-President and President in 1856. Seward had preferred Adams for England, because Adams had been a major supporter of Seward's conservative policies in the secession crisis and, before that, of Seward's nomination for the Presidency in 1860. Moreover, he had no love for Frémont. Lincoln yielded, but when Seward sought to press Charles L. Wilson's appointment for Chicago, he ran afoul of Lincoln's strong obligation to John Locke Scripps, editor of the *Chicago Press and Tribune*, who had prepared a campaign biography of the President in the summer of 1860. Scripps got the Chicago post office, and Lincoln did his best to mollify Seward by giving Wilson the secretaryship in the English legation. Thus the Chicago post office was a subject of interest to Seward, Lincoln, and Adams. In fact, since Isaac Arnold of Chicago was also present, it was about the only interest that everyone present had in common.

For Adams, the nature of the conversation was insulting enough anyhow. Surely a mitigating circumstance, however, was the fact that their meeting was not a formal one — that Seward and Adams came unannounced. Moreover, Arnold was already waiting to see the President when they came in, and, if his presence had already been announced, it was no wonder the Chicago post office was the first subject which came to mind after he had "said something complimentary" to the distinguished representative of the Adams dynasty.

Why, over the years, did the Adams family's version of the story change? Why did Isaac Arnold disappear from the scene altogether, so that the men-

tion of the post office became a gross equation of the highest diplomatic post with a miserable and petty patronage plum? The answer lies in the interests and needs of the storytellers, and a clue lies ready at hand, again, in the famous *Education of Henry Adams*. Describing his feeling of "ridiculous" inadequacy to be the private secretary to his father in London, Adams could recall that he was comforted only by the knowledge that he "was not a vulture of carrion — patronage."


The Adams family had a long tradition of political aloofness, despite their ability to play the game with skill. In the Presidency of John Adams, the Sedition Act squinted towards the elimination of any legitimate party opposition. Yet Adams himself came nearer than many of his Federalist cohorts to accepting party as a necessary evil, and his rival Jefferson was almost as willing to see critical newspapers prosecuted by government (as long as it was a state and not the federal government) as Adams was. The spirit of the times in the early republic was hostile to political party.

John Quincy Adams began as a moderate Federalist too and did those things that a politician had to do to remain in the good graces of the democratic masses. As a National Republican, he gained the Presidency in 1824 by what his critics called a "corrupt bargain" with Henry Clay — a union, it was said, of the Puritan and the Blackleg, Blifil and Black George. As President, however, he refused to turn out officeholders who were working against his reelection, and he lost in 1828 in part because of reluctance to bargain with the Anti-Masons.

Charles Francis Adams lost the chance he had for the Liberal Republican

nomination in 1872 by writing a frosty letter claiming that he did not want the nomination, that he would not negotiate for it or give any assurances to anybody, and that he would accept only an "unequivocal call." One of the major planks of the Liberal Republican platform was civil service reform, and increasingly the Adams family showed interest in reforms which would get good men rather than party hacks into office. The reform served an urgent family need — some would say almost a psychological need — among Charles Francis Adams's children.

As the prospects that Henry, Brooks, John Quincy, 2d, or Charles Francis, Junior, would reach the station attained by their grandfather dimmed, the feeling that political parties were corrupt engines for driving mediocrities



and demagogues to office sharpened. Henry learned early that "Truth in politics might be ignored as a delusion." The political process seemed to favor "men whose energies were the greater, the less they wasted on thought; men who sprang from the soil to power; . . . more or less dull in outward appearance." The political unrest of the 1890s made him think "it probably his last chance of standing up for his eighteenth-century principles, strict construction, limited powers, George Washington, John Adams, and the rest." The giants of the era of the Founding Fathers were still available, but America did not call them.

By the 1890s, Henry's brother Charles was, in the words of his biographer, a "patrician at bay." In 1896, he wrote a friend about politics, "I can influence no one. Everyone I could possibly influence . . . thinks as I do, while those who think otherwise regard me as belonging essentially to the 'classes,' and as, therefore, not even entitled to a hearing, much less to any degree of confidence, on the part of what they are pleased to call the 'masses.'" He was at work on the biography of his father at this very time; the volume was shaped by these feelings. The equation of the Court of Saint James with the Chicago post office was all he could see in this father's diary account. It exemplified the forces that made the Adams family feel irrelevant. Isaac Arnold then vanished from the Cabinet room, never to return. Martin Duberman's 1961 biography of Charles Francis Adams repeats the story as Charles, Junior, told it.

Charles Francis Adams took his revenge on Lincoln. In 1873, he delivered a eulogy on William H. Seward before the New York legislature. Adams was still "Seward's man," in a sense, and he still tended to view Lincoln as he had appeared to Seward in the midst of the secession crisis. After that, Adams had left for Europe, not to return until after Lincoln's death; his sparser contact with domestic events in America failed to keep him in touch with Seward's changing viewpoint. Moreover, the inadequacy of his awkward meeting with Lincoln still rankled him.

After a statement that Lincoln "afterward proved himself before the world a pure, brave, honest man, faithful to his arduous task, and laying down his life at the last as a penalty for his country's safety," Adams devoted himself to "strict justice in discriminating between persons." He affirmed "without hesitation that, in the history of our Government down to this hour, no experiment so rash has ever been made as that of elevating to the head of affairs a man with so little previous preparation for his task as Mr. Lincoln." Of foreign affairs "he knew absolutely nothing," and "he was quite deficient in his acquaintance with the character and qualities of public men, or their aptitude for the positions to which he assigned them. Indeed, he never selected them solely by that standard." In fact, Lincoln largely ignored experience and technical qualifications: "It was either partisan service, or geographical position, or the length of the lists of names to commendatory papers, or the size of the salary, or the unblushing pertinacity of personal solicitation, that wrung from him many of his appointments." Seward was Lincoln's superior "in native intellectual power, in extent of acquirement, in breadth of philosophical experience, and in the force of moral discipline." Nevertheless, "Mr. Seward voluntarily dismissed forever the noblest dreams of an ambition" for the Presidency which "he had the clearest right to indulge, in exchange for a more solid power to direct affairs for the benefit of the nation, through the name of another, who should yet appear in all later time to reap the honors due chiefly to his labors."

The notion that Seward was the power behind the throne was not new. John Wilkes Booth, for one, held that theory and therefore included Seward as a victim in his grisly assassination plot. To have that theory come from a source as highly placed as Adams had been, however, was a matter of great significance. Immediately, the surviving members of Lincoln's Cabinet initiated a correspondence among themselves discussing "a general statement correcting the misrepresentations semi-officially put forth at Albany." Salmon Chase, Montgomery Blair, and Gideon Welles thought about making such a statement. Chase, however, died just a month after Adams's address, and Welles felt that the passing of the members of the Cabinet suggested the urgency of a fuller statement of the opposite view while it was still possible to obtain it from eyewitnesses. Late in 1873, Welles published three arti-

cles in answer to the address and published a fuller version in a book, *Lincoln and Seward*, in 1874.

These were the first big volleys in the long war over Lincoln's reputation. The terms of the debate quickly left the era of civil service reform behind, and there was never any great reason to investigate the roots of Adams's dislike. Chroniclers of the Adams family perpetuated the story of the meeting as "Lincolniana" became a field unto itself. The paths of these two great American names hardly ever crossed again.

Still, one need not be acquainted with the *arcana* of the Lincoln field in order to be able to describe the meeting between Adams and Lincoln in a different light. Henry Adams's autobiography contains the clue to the relevance of the Chicago post office. Charles's biography of his father all but invites comparison with the original diary entry. And the "Adams Chronicles" had access to the cooperation of the publishers of the Adams papers, available on microfilm to everyone.

The problem was not lack of zeal for research, necessarily, nor was it protectiveness of the Adams family name. The problem was the medium. Television demands drama, brief situations in which both action and dialogue tell a story of interest. Drama does not lend itself well to explaining the intricacies of patronage policy. In an hour on the subject of the Adams mission to London, television cannot explain that two Chicago newspapers editors vied for the same patronage plum, that one was championed by Seward and the other by Lincoln, that such patronage was customarily the preserve of the local Congressman who had become irate that the choice was removed from his hands, that Seward's influence on Lincoln was rising but had been exhausted by getting Adams rather than Dayton the appointment to England, that Lincoln tried even so to please Seward by giving his man in Chicago a job in England, that this man was inadequate to the task but that Seward could not tell the President so because the appointee was Seward's man, and that therefore the Chicago post office had a vital connection to the Court of Saint James. This is a subject for a book or, perhaps, a lecture; it is not the stuff of television drama. But it is history.





FIGURE 4. Pamphlet version of C. F. Adams's eulogy on Seward.



Lincoln Lore

June, 1980

Bulletin of the Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum. Mark E. Neely, Jr., Editor.
Mary Jane Hubler, Editorial Assistant. Published each month by the
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, Fort Wayne, Indiana 46801.

Number 1708

BLAIR

The elder statesman is a familiar fixture on the Washington political scene today. In recent years, the names of Clark Clifford and Averell Harriman have often appeared in the headlines at times of national crisis. Abraham Lincoln's administration was one long crisis, and Francis Preston Blair was the Civil War's elder statesman. A relic of the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, Blair was influential because of his proximity to Washington, his blurred partisanship, his many political connections, and his age and experience. At last he has a modern biographer, Elbert B. Smith, who gives considerable stress to the Civil War years in *Francis Preston Blair* (New York: The Free Press, 1980).

Blair was seventy years old when the Civil War began. An architect of Jacksonian Democracy in his prime, he bitterly opposed the expansion of slavery and became an important founder of the Republican party when he was well into his sixties. His family and political relations formed a powerful network throughout the Union, especially in the Border States of Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky. One of his sons, Montgomery Blair, was Lincoln's Postmaster General. Francis Preston Blair, Jr., "Frank," flitted from politics to the battlefield and had sensational impact almost everywhere he went. Even Francis P. Blair's political enemies liked him personally. His family adored him and carried his political ideas everywhere they went. Like most elder statesmen, he played his largest role in foreign policy, initiating the abortive Hampton Roads Peace Conference. Confederates who would trust no other Republican trusted Blair.


This is a competent and fair-minded biography of a man whose political ideas have not been popular in recent years. Like all elder statesmen, Blair's age made him in some respects a political troglodyte. A kindly slaveholder himself, Blair and his politically important family were ardent colonizationists long after the idea was a sociological, political, and economic absurdity. The

triumph of their conservative — even reactionary — constitutional ideas after Lincoln's death has not endeared the Blairs to modern historians. Eight years ago, when I asked a college professor what was the point of his lecture on Reconstruction in an American history survey course, he replied humorously, "To hell with Montgomery Blair." Smith's biography, which is particularly strong on the Blair family's inner workings, is a valuable corrective to this hostility absorbed by so many historians in recent years. It is most illuminating to discover how personally likable the old man was. Even the unbudging Charles Sumner never took personal exception to attacks on his political ideas by members of the Blair clan.

Nevertheless, the book's weaknesses must be the real focus

of this review. Despite competent research and readable prose, *Francis Preston Blair* is lacking in at least one important respect. Professor Smith, for all his ability to capture Blair the man, never quite delineates Blair the political thinker. To describe the political thought of many a politician / editor / wire-puller, would be a mistake. Opportunism and ad hoc political apologetics too often destroy anything systematic about their political thinking. With Blair, however, it is a serious mistake not to do so. He played a larger role in making Jacksonian political doctrine than Andrew Jackson himself did. When political problems arose, President Jackson always shouted, "Take it to Bla'ar." Despite his ability to land on his feet politically, despite his brave and clever moving with the times into the Republican party, and despite his steady personal loyalty to those he served, Blair's ideas had so ossified by the Civil War era that the most distinctive thing about him was his ideological quality. Even when his policies were up to date, the ideas underlying them were strangely archaic.

Blair was an ideologue, and his children inherited a penchant for grandiose ideas from him. It is virtually impossible, incidentally, to write about Francis Preston Blair. One



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 1. Dust jacket of the new Blair biography.



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 2. French troops in Mexico worried Blair but did not faze Lincoln.

must always write about the Blairs. Smith does this without really admitting that he does, probably because the only other existing work on the subject, William Ernest Smith's *The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics*, did exactly the same thing in 1933. One is immediately attracted to Elbert B. Smith's *Francis Preston Blair* because it promises to sort one member of that clan out, but, in fact, the modern Smith cannot do it either. When one finishes the new book, one still thinks of the Blairs' political ideas, not Montgomery's, not Frank's, and not the patriarch's particular ideas.

These ideas were all important, and they are all too sketchily delineated in Professor Smith's book. What Smith has failed to describe is the tendency among the Blairs to think always in systematic, gigantic, almost cosmic geopolitical terms. Among American politicians this trait has often been lacking, and it is a serious error for a biographer of such a rare thinker to ignore it.

To end the Civil War in 1865, Blair concocted a scheme to fight France in Mexico. This was the idea behind the Hamp-

ton Roads Peace Conference, and it is common knowledge. There are other clues in Smith's book that the Blairs always painted their political ideas on a grand canvas. The Blairs were not deeply troubled by the policy of emancipation. As Francis P. Blair explained to a Maryland friend as early as April 9, 1862:

You seem dissatisfied over abolition. All practical men are now sensible that slavery so affects the people whether it ought to do so or not as to make it a terrible institution to our race. They see that it imbues a brother's hand in a brother's blood, and invites foreign despots to plant monarchies on our continent. With this result before us, the only enquiry should be how to get rid of an institution which produces such miseries.

Never content with the practical, parochial, and powerful argument that slavery was bad for the white race, Blair somehow managed to conjure up the bogey of monarchy.

True, French bayonets propped Maximilian up on the Mexican throne, but most Americans took little interest in Latin America. President Lincoln was never much interested in Mexican schemes. As a former Whig, he had long detested American imperial designs on her southern neighbor. A politician of moral vision, Lincoln was also an eminently practical man, and he was content to fight one war at a time. Blair, on the other hand, was obsessed with the monarchical threat on America's southern flank. Democratic politicians, even those with free-soil proclivities like Blair's, had a weakness for Latin American ventures.

Somehow, any threat to American national solidarity caused Blair to see monarchy in the wings. Months before the firing on Fort Sumter, the elder

statesman told Lincoln that the North was "as much bound to resist the South Carolina Movement, as that of planting a monarchy in our midst by a European potentate." The days of Jackson seemed not far removed to Blair, who still called the secessionists of 1860-1861 "nullifiers." His policy of resisting secession was up-to-date, all right, but the assumptions behind it were decades old. Earlier still, just after Lincoln's election in November, 1860, Blair had given him a piece of bad advice, telling him to mention colonization in his letter accepting the Republican nomination. This would have the practical effect of warding off "the attacks, made upon us about negro equality." Blair did not leave the subject on that banal, but practical plane, however. He also launched into an elaborate analogy between the Chiriqui Improvement Company, an outfit poised to colonize blacks in Latin America, and the old East India Company, which had made England's empire in India possible. The same anarchy which had invited English intervention in India through a private corporation prevailed "among the little confederacies . . .

South of the Free States of this continent." Chiriqui, Blair said, "may be made the pivot on which to rest our lever to sway Central America and secure . . . the control . . . necessary for the preservation of our Republican Institutions." He was like an ancient and battered weather vane rusted into pointing fixedly in the same direction all the time. Sometimes the winds shifted so that he pointed the way truly, but the key factor was his fixity, not his wisdom.

Inside Blair's odd-shaped and proverbially ugly head, there swam a strange array of sophisticated but old-fashioned ideas. The electoral defeat of Breckinridge, Bell, and Douglas could lead him to think, not of possible civil war or the deeper problem of slavery and racism which underlay that threat, but of Mexico and monarchy. He could leap from politic considerations of the racial views of the American electorate to geopolitical blather about analogies to the British empire. And all this was mixed with occasional acute judgments and a charming self-deprecation. In a letter written before Lincoln's election, Blair told his son Frank that Lincoln had "genius [and] . . . political knowledge" and stressed the importance of his honesty in bringing support. Blair described himself as "a sort of relic which Genl Jackson wielded against the very Nullification" which again threatened the Union.

Smith leaves much of this out, and, in doing so, he nearly leaves Blair out of his biography of Blair. It is most unfortunate that Smith chose to write a "life and times" of Blair, for his life was long and his times comprehended most of American political history from the Era of Good Feelings to the end of Reconstruction. Smith spends entirely too much time in describing general political events, sometimes well and sometimes poorly, and far too little time in analyzing Blair's political vision.

One cannot, from all evidence, dismiss as claptrap and window dressing the grand geopolitical context of Blair's often crudely practical ideas. Though attempting to escape the wrath of Northern racism may appear to be the only operative content in Blair's colonization obsession, in fact the analogies to England and the muttering about monarchy seem really to be the heart and kernel of his thought. In the letter suggesting that Lincoln talk of colonization as a way to ward off accusations that Republicans advocated racial equality, Blair explained the connection between monarchy and slavery. The Southern "oligarchy," he thought, had lost its American love of freedom and saw the "degraded lower orders of whites" as fit only to be slaves or soldiers. Southerners would rather fight than work, and such pre-bourgeois attitudes (Blair did not use that term) would lead to monarchy. From this system of ideas, at least in part, came the Blairs' famed obstinate resistance to secession and compromise!

Francis P. Blair's fevered vision of American politics was always informed by his acquaintance with world history. From the men he regarded as the great luminaries of American history, Washington, Jefferson, and Jackson, Blair claimed to have learned the inevitability of a final solution to America's race problem. "The period has come," he told Lincoln after his election, "which Mr. Jefferson saw would arrive, rendering the deportation or extermination of the African Race from among us, inevitable." He pointed to the "Hostilities of irreconcilable Castes" which "marked the annals of Spain during 800 years, springing from the abhorrent mixture of the Moors with Spaniards, in the same peninsula." Lincoln called him "Father Blair," and one can imagine the mixture of awe and incredulity with which he must have regarded such cosmic musings. The President's own political vision included little of this grand world-historical baggage. Yet at the moment of his greatest political influence on the Lincoln administration, the time of the Hampton Roads Peace Conference, Blair insisted to Lincoln: "You see that I make the great point of this matter that the War is no longer made for slavery but monarchy." The old man blurted his fears that Jefferson Davis would league with a foreign monarchy to save Southern independence. He babbled that Napoleon had wanted a black army from Santo Domingo to invade the American South, stir up insurrection, and bring about French conquest of the United States. At Hampton Roads, by contrast, Lincoln scoffed that he left history lessons to Seward. The President



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 3. Francis Preston Blair, Jr.

was interested in Southern peace terms — even, as G.S. Boritt has suggested, in how much coin it would take essentially to bribe the South into reunion.

Jefferson Davis was a political realist too. He told Blair that France did not want a Mexican empire as much as she wanted a base from which to build up her feeble navy. Davis, at war with an industrially superior nation, knew the lure of coal, iron, and timber. Blair did not get the point. He still feared that Davis would become France's ally in subjecting the United States to monarchy. The elder statesman told Lincoln, far too busy even to read long letters from his generals, to observe the parallels with modern times in Carlyle's *Life of Frederick the Great*.

An old-fashioned idea lay at the heart of Francis P. Blair's thought and that of his influential children. Jacksonian ideologues always saw sharp class conflicts in America. They thought government aid to private corporations aided only rich men. They denied the possible general benefits of economic development. Such issues were irrelevant during the Civil War, but seeing Southern society in the same class terms was not. A perception of class conflict between Southern poor whites and a slaveholding oligarchy apparently lay at the bottom of Blair's fears of Southern willingness to invite monarchies to save their movement for independence. This error in perception of Southern society had serious political consequences. Montgomery Blair inherited from his father a penchant for seeing class conflict, whether it was there or not. Montgomery always insisted that secession was a minority movement and that "Military Government" in the Confederacy held the essentially loyal Southern masses at bay. This was carrying the common Northern belief in the existence of a slave oligarchy to an extreme, but in 1861 more people than the Blairs believed it. Even President Lincoln may have thought that way in 1861. He at least insisted that there was no majority for secession in any Southern state except, perhaps, South Carolina.

Ever the practical observer, Lincoln came to see that this could not be so. After two and one-half years of war, Lincoln admitted that it would be difficult to find even ten percent of the population in any Southern state loyal to the Union. Montgomery Blair never changed his mind. The rigid Blair class analysis ground to its inexorable conclusions. The point



A SELF-APPOINTED ENVOY.

From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum


FIGURE 4. This cartoon from *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, January 21, 1865, depicted Blair as a granny, trying to bring the Confederacy to the bargaining table with sugarplums and barley water. General Ulysses S. Grant points to cannonballs as the more appropriate way of convincing the Confederates to rejoin the Union.

of the Postmaster General's famous speech at Rockville, Maryland, late in 1863, was that there existed a loyal *majority* in the South against which the North must never be at war. It brought him the undying hatred of all the Radical Republicans (except friendly Charles Sumner). There is little wonder the Blairs opposed Reconstruction. They had never seen much disloyalty in need of restructuring into loyalty.

It is almost impossible to write a decent biography of a man the biographer hates. The spirit rebels so at spending great amounts of time with an unlikable person that it can result only in unbalanced fulmination against the poor subject of the biography. The problem with Elbert B. Smith's *Francis Preston Blair* is not its mild bias in favor of its subject. This is almost necessary in order to attract a biographer to work, and it is rendered harmless by the common knowledge that most biographers suffer from this fault. Abraham Lincoln himself scorned biography because of its predictable lionization of its subject, no matter what the subject's faults.

The problem with this book is more serious. Smith fails essentially to capture Francis Preston Blair's nature. The

ideologue surfaces only occasionally, most notably in Smith's treatment of Frank Blair's speech "The Destiny of the Races of this Continent," delivered in Boston in 1859. There the great Blair political universe is laid out in an astonishing array of references to Dr. Livingstone on African hybrids and to the role of Moors in Spanish history. The speech, as Blair's daughter observed, dazzled "not only the politicians — but the Literati — & State street gentility." Smith's discussion of it dazzles the modern reader too and should make him wonder where all these ideas came from and whither they were going in the Civil War. This rare and brief glimpse of the Blair world view is but a dazzling moment in what is otherwise a competent, but sometimes sketchy, chronicle of Blair's role in many events of American history described at too great length. The inner springs of this fascinating elder statesman's thought and actions are too often left unexplained. And, as Smith's book clearly proves, Blair's thought and action were too important to too many people — from Andrew Jackson to Abraham Lincoln, from Thomas Hart Benton to Charles Sumner — to be left in such a state.




Lincoln Lore

February, 1981

Bulletin of the Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum. Mark E. Neely, Jr., Editor.
Mary Jane Hubler, Editorial Assistant. Published each month by the
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, Fort Wayne, Indiana 46801.

Number 1716

Of Tangled Stories and Charnwood's *Lincoln*



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 1. The centennial celebration of Lincoln's birth in 1909 helped make Lincoln's image a powerful national symbol. By the time of World War I, Lincoln's face appeared frequently in war propaganda. In the same era, Charnwood's *Lincoln* helped make him an international figure.

Godfrey Rathbone Benson, Lord Charnwood, was an unlikely Lincoln biographer. The British upper classes were notoriously pro-Southern during the American Civil War, and he was born in that station in life in 1864. He did well at Oxford University, where he was later a tutor. He became a Member of Parliament and the Mayor of Lichfield.

After his graduation from Oxford in 1887, Charnwood made a tour of the United States. He returned briefly—to Boston and New York—in 1894. In politics, he was a Liberal. He was obviously interested in the United States, and, as a boy, he had read Charles G. Leland's *Abraham Lincoln*, a book memorable enough to be mentioned in the brief bibliographical note at the end of Charnwood's biography of Lincoln.

Charnwood's *Abraham Lincoln* was published in England in 1916. Available evidence suggests that his boyhood interest in Lincoln, his acquaintance with and admiration for the United States, and his liberal political leanings helped lead him to writing the book. The date of its publication, however, more strongly suggests that the atmosphere of co-operation between the United States and England, which grew up at the time of the First World War, must have played a large role in molding a sympathetic interest into the drive to write a substantial book on Abraham Lincoln.

The result, as all Lincoln students are aware, was wonderful. George Bernard Shaw told Lincoln collector Judd Stewart that Charnwood's "very penetrating biography" created "a cult of Lincoln in England." Its reception in America, following its publication there in 1917, was equally enthusiastic. The enthusiasm, as Paul M. Angle later noted, was lasting and pointed to merits in the work beyond its timeliness for the period of the final thaw in Anglo-American relations. In 1935 Roy P. Basler thought that Carl Sandburg and Nathaniel Wright Stephenson presented "the best version of the private Lincoln," but Charnwood's was still "the best of the public Lincoln." As late as 1947, Benjamin P. Thomas, an excellent judge of such matters, called Charnwood's book "the best one-volume life of Lincoln ever written."

Lincoln students may be a little unclear in regard to the precise reason Charnwood wrote his book, but they are unanimous on the reasons for its high reputation and popularity. David M. Potter's *The Lincoln Theme and American National Historiography* identified these clearly. No Lincoln biography before



Courtesy Adams National Historic Site
(from the *Dictionary of American Portraits*, published by Dover Publications, Inc., in 1967)

FIGURE 2. Henry Adams.

Charnwood's was "genuinely contemplative." Charnwood's *Lincoln*, as it is usually called, was. Paul M. Angle's *A Shelf of Lincoln Books* put it this way: "... it is not primarily factual, as for example, Nicolay's *Short Life* is factual. The emphasis is rather upon interpretation and analysis." Potter also pointed to the book's "notable literary excellence." Angle credited Charnwood with bringing "literary skill to the Lincoln theme," far exceeding the prosaic Nicolay and Hay or the hasty journalistic style of Ida Tarbell. Potter found "especial merit" in Charnwood's ability "to grasp the universality of Lincoln's significance." Angle also noted the Englishman's "conviction that Lincoln was one of the world's truly great men." Though critics did not say so explicitly, this trait set the book apart from the narrow nationalism even of contemporary biographers as talented as Stephenson and Albert Beveridge.

Charnwood was sympathetic, but he wrote from a cultural distance that Midwesterners like William Herndon, Jesse Weik, John Nicolay, and John Hay lacked perforce. This exempted Charnwood from a kind of partisanship that no American at the time seemed able to escape. Potter saw in this the root of Charnwood's unembarrassed ability to ask the "hard" questions about Lincoln:

Did Lincoln temporize too much on slavery? Was there a quality of "cheap opportunism" in his political record? Did his policy at Fort Sumter differ from Buchanan's enough to justify the customary practice of gibbeting the silly old man while leaving Lincoln free from criticism? Was he, in the last analysis, responsible for precipitating the Civil War?

Lord Charnwood admitted that he did not "shrink... from the display of a partisanship" that led him to state frankly that the South's cause was wrong. What made his book exceptional was, as Potter stated, that Charnwood at least asked the questions. What also made the book good was Charnwood's view—as accurate today as it was in 1916—that the "true obligation of impartiality is that he [the author] should conceal no fact which, in his own mind, tells against his views." His was not the advocate's effort to pile up all the facts that help his argument but the fair-minded historian's

attempt to answer those arguments which seem most telling against his own case.

Charnwood, therefore, was never afraid to criticize Lincoln. Relying on the inaccurate literature available at the time, for example, Charnwood pictured Lincoln's father as "a migrant" and claimed that the "unseemliness in talk of rough, rustic boys flavoured the great President's conversation through life." (He saw, more accurately, that Lincoln was "void of romantic fondness for vanished joys of youth.") He labeled Lincoln's use of martial law in the North a usurpation of power.

Charnwood did no original research for the book and relied for facts on a small number of standard works, but he was a well-read man who used his generally cultured background to good effect. In a passage of marvelous irony, the learned Englishman criticized one of America's own great critics of democracy, Henry Adams, by saying, "It is a contemptible trait in books like that able novel 'Democracy,' that they treat the sentiment which attached to the 'Rail-splitter' as anything but honourable." Less accurate in the long run but appealing in the period of the book's greatest popularity was the viewpoint Charnwood derived from reading James Bryce's *American Commonwealth*. That critique of American politics made Charnwood hostile to political parties and the spoils system that Lincoln used so well. Charnwood saw American party politics as avoiding serious issues and largely incapable of producing great leaders. Of Lincoln's election in 1860, he said that "the fit man was chosen on the very ground of his supposed unfitness."

Lord Charnwood appreciated Lincoln's common origins, but he dwelled particularly on Lincoln's statesmanship. Secession, to Charnwood, was a broadly popular movement in the South aimed at saving slavery, and Lincoln's efforts to counter it were noble, progressive, and somehow Christian. Following a current of British military opinion at the time, he praised Lincoln's abilities as a commander in chief. He did not belittle the Emancipation Proclamation. It could be interpreted as a narrowly military measure only in law, Charnwood argued. Given the limited research he did for the biography, one is not surprised to learn that Charnwood repeated some spurious quotations and anecdotes. He often handled these well. Of the apocryphal story of Lincoln's clemency for the sleeping sentinel William Scott, Charnwood concluded: "If the story is not true—and there is no reason whatever to doubt it—still it is a remarkable man of whom



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 3. Jesse Weik.

people spin yarns of that kind." A man of deep religious interests himself, Charnwood noted Lincoln's growth in that realm to the "language of intense religious feeling" in the Second Inaugural Address.


Charnwood kept his focus on the meaning of Lincoln's efforts to save the Union. These, he thought, were attempts to save democratic government for the whole world. He properly stressed Lincoln's praise for Henry Clay as a patriot who "loved his country, partly because it was his own country, and mostly because it was a free country."

Maintaining focus in a Lincoln biography was a real achievement, and focusing it on the truly important questions was Charnwood's greatest achievement. It is difficult to discover the means by which he did this because Charnwood letters are rather scarce in this country. This institution, though it seeks the letters of Lincoln's biographers, has not a single Charnwood letter. The Illinois State Historical Library has less than half a dozen. Among the later, however, there is one illuminating letter to Jesse W. Weik.

Written on May 17, 1919, just after Charnwood's triumphant lecture tour of the United States, the letter acknowledged Weik's gift of two Lincoln autographs for Lady Charnwood's autograph collection. Echoing a phrase from a famous Lincoln letter, Lord Charnwood characterized the gift as "such an addition . . . as she had never hoped to obtain, knowing that indeed Lincoln autographs are not plenty as blackberries." He apologized for the delay in writing. His younger son, eight years old, had been killed in a fall from a pony. He told Weik that the United States appeared much changed since his first visit thirty-one years before, "mainly . . . for the good."

Naturally, the letter soon got around to the subject of Abraham Lincoln. On his recent tour of the United States, Lord Charnwood wrote, "I came across, & indeed have been coming across ever since I published my book, many signs of the tendency, which had been active, to make a sort of stained-glass-window figure of Lincoln, quite removed from genuine human sympathy & impossible really to revere." He noted, tactfully, that Weik's own book, written with William Herndon, "made it impossible that such a tendency should lastingly prevail." In writing Weik, Charnwood diplomatically avoided commenting directly on the overall accuracy of the Herndon-Weik book. He said only that he had studied it carefully or that it prevented uncritical hero worship. Charnwood was careful thus to pay his "respects to one of the pioneer writers on the subject of which" Charnwood was "a junior student."

Charnwood's tour had brought him into contact with the controversies over Lincoln's ancestry, then raging in America. "The question," Charnwood commented, "is of little interest in itself,—not that heredity is an unimportant influence (for of course it is vastly important) but that its working is generally too subtle to be traced, that when we have the correct names of a great man's grand-parents & great-grand-parents (& how few of us can name all our great-grand-parents!) they generally remain mere names, and finally that nothing in his or any man's ancestry adds anything or detracts anything to or from his individual worth." Here again was Lord Charnwood at his tactful and ironic best—an Englishman, who did "not care two pence, or a cent (which is less) about the authority of this or any other pedigree (my own for example)," giving lessons on individualism to an American whose book had made rather a sensation for what it said about Lincoln's ancestry.



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 4. British playwright John Drinkwater drew inspiration for his popular play about Lincoln from Lord Charnwood's biography. The play was first performed in America in 1919.

"So," Charnwood said, "this question thoroughly bores me." Then, remembering the letter's recipient, he added a hasty parenthetical comment—"except that Lincoln's own interest in the subject is an interesting trait in him as Herndon & Weik record it." Still, having written a book about Lincoln, Charnwood felt that he might be "bound to know what there is to be known about it." Several questions followed for the sake of "antiquarian accuracy."

Charnwood had known of the questions surrounding Lincoln's Hanks ancestry when he wrote his book, and he queried Weik about new theories on the legitimacy of Lincoln's mother. In America, Charnwood had been astonished to learn that some raised questions about Lincoln's own legitimacy. "My time at Springfield," Charnwood said, "(in which I met some delightful people of the older generation who gave me, though without much detail a vivid impression of old times) was a little too much taken up with hearing tangled stories in which this question [of Lincoln's legitimacy] got mixed up with the other which I have spoken of [the question of Lincoln's mother's legitimacy]." One man in particular had been much taken with the notion that Lincoln was descended from John Marshall. "I think my friend," Charnwood went on, "is merely suffering from a variety of the same disease which makes others desire to derive Lincoln from wholly respectable people of [as] good standing as possible. He can not suffer it that a great man should have arisen without some ancestor of manifest intellectual eminence." Charnwood was "inclined to treat the idea as rubbish," but he still wanted to know whether there was anything to it.

Lord Charnwood concluded his letter thus:

I feel almost ashamed to have filled up my letter with questions which are of no importance in comparison with the actual life & work & character of the man who was any way Abraham Lincoln whoever his ancestors were.

Never afraid to ask questions or hear answers that might change his mind, Lord Charnwood nevertheless kept his focus always on the essentials of Lincoln's greatness.

Lloyd Ostendorf Joins Bibliography Committee

Lloyd Ostendorf of Dayton, Ohio, will join the Bibliography Committee which passes judgment on the inclusion of items in *Lincoln Lore's* Cumulative Bibliography. Born in Dayton on June 23, 1921, Mr. Ostendorf graduated from Stivers High School in his home town in 1939. He began studying art after his graduation. He attended the Dayton Art Institute from 1939 to 1941. He spent the summer of 1940 in New York City, studying with cartoonist Milton Caniff and his associates. In 1941 Mr. Ostendorf enlisted in the Army Air Corps, with which he served until 1945.

The war interrupted Mr. Ostendorf's career in illustration and portrait work which began in 1939. He has furnished art work for many different publications and projects, and much of it has focused on Abraham Lincoln. Fascinated by the "oddly balanced ruggedness and beauty" of Lincoln's face, he began drawing pictures of Lincoln when he was twelve years old. His attention naturally turned to the photographs of Lincoln which he copied and adapted. Mr. Ostendorf got special encouragement in his work from Louis A. Warren, one of the few Lincoln authorities at the time interested in encouraging work with Lincoln pictures. As he sought photographs from which to work, Mr. Ostendorf also came into contact with Frederick Hill Meserve, the first great student and collector of Lincoln photographs. Meserve was "as nice as an old man could be to a young man" who shared his interest, Mr. Ostendorf remembers.

Mr. Ostendorf's first book *A Picture Story of Abraham Lincoln* (1962), a biography for young readers, was so popular that it has been reissued by Lamplight Publishing, Inc., as *Abraham Lincoln: The Boy and the Man*. His next work was

Lincoln in Photographs: An Album of Every Known Pose (1963), which he wrote with Charles Hamilton. This book, essential to even the smallest Lincoln library, is still available from the University of Oklahoma Press. Hardly a week passes in which the staff of the Louis A. Warren Lincoln Library and Museum fails to consult this fine book to answer questions about Lincoln photographs and the many lithographs and engravings inspired by them, and this is surely true of every other Lincoln institution as well.

Mr. Ostendorf's expertise in this very specialized but popular area of Lincolniana has been widely recognized. Lincoln Memorial University awarded him the Lincoln Diploma of Honor in 1966. Lincoln College awarded him an honorary degree (Litt. D.) in 1968, and Lincoln Memorial University added another (Art. D.) in 1974. He has been the art editor of the *Lincoln Herald* since 1957, and all Lincoln students are familiar with the wonderfully varied covers he provides for that quarterly journal. He was also an honorary member of the National Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission.

Mr. Ostendorf, in addition to illustrating greeting cards and religious materials, maintains his interest in Lincolniana. He recently completed a painting of Lincoln's stepmother for the Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center in Mattoon, Illinois. Another recent portrait of Mary Todd Lincoln as a young woman hangs in the restored Todd home in Lexington, Kentucky. Studying photographs in order to determine what historical figures looked like in periods when no photographs of them are available is a special interest. Mr. Ostendorf has also been working on three books: a study of Lincoln portraits from life (with Harold Holzer); the recollections of Mariah Vance, a Lincoln family maid in Springfield (with David Balsiger); and a Lincoln family photograph album (with James T. Hickey).

Over the years, Mr. Ostendorf's interests have grown from Lincoln's physical appearance to all aspects of his life. His general knowledge and his special expertise make him a most welcome addition to the advisory board.



From the Louis A. Warren
Lincoln Library and Museum

FIGURE 5. Lloyd Ostendorf

The Foreign Policy Of Abraham Lincoln

Tuesday, April 06, 2010


By Harvey Sicherman for [FPRI](#)

My remarks about Abraham Lincoln and American foreign policy cover three topics. I will begin with the relationship between Lincoln and William H. Seward, his Secretary of State, then examine several cases of foreign policy in action, particularly during 1861 and 1862, years fraught with peril for the Union cause. Finally, I will draw some conclusions about Lincoln and foreign policy relevant to us today.

American foreign policy starts with the president and his relationship to the secretary of state. Although not listed in the U.S. Constitution (it was invented by George Washington) this post became very significant in the nineteenth century. Often the man chosen as secretary was the president's designated political successor. Thus, in Lincoln's time, it was doubly important that the president and his appointee work well together.

In that context, Lincoln and Seward were a very odd couple. They differed dramatically in appearance, background, and manner. We know Lincoln's biography — born in 1809, his rural upbringing, his background — such as it was — in politics. When he became President of the United States, he was the least experienced man ever to take the job. Although largely self-taught, with no connection to high society, Lincoln had married above his station and became a very successful “frontier” lawyer. Most of his contemporaries thought Lincoln a country rube, however.

Contrast that with Seward. Eight years Lincoln's senior (a very big difference in an age of short lives), he was a native New Yorker and very well educated. He, too, married “well,” the daughter of a judge who was politically active. A veteran of public office, including Senator for New York, he also had many foreign acquaintances. He rivaled Lincoln for the nomination. Even after Lincoln's election, Senator Seward had tried various legislative formulae to save the Union independently of the president elect.



Let me share a woodcut of the Lincoln Cabinet. If you look immediately to the right of Lincoln, that's Mr. Seward. The reason Mr. Seward is standing is because Mr. Seward was very slight and possibly only 5'6". Now Lincoln, as we know, was 6'4", a very gangly man, whose very gangliness made him appear even taller than he was. So in all of these portraits of the time — the Cabinet portraits — they always show Seward standing so that his shortness wouldn't be emphasized. Even so, I think, that the engraver has taken liberties with Seward's height... unless he's standing on some kind of a platform. I doubt that Seward standing up rose much above Lincoln's head.

They also had very different mannerisms. Lincoln was jocular. He also had what they called at the time “slow intelligence,” which meant that he didn't react sharply to things — he liked to mull things over. Seward, on the other hand, was all snap, crackle and pop. People who knew him didn't take his outbursts too seriously, but

people who did not, including diplomats, were quite often frightened, even when he was senator, by his force and vitriol.

This Cabinet has been called, by one modern historian, the “team of rivals,” as they were all opponents either of Lincoln or of each other over the course of their political careers. The so-called “team” so unnerved one of Lincoln’s confidants that he said to Lincoln, “They will eat you!” To which Lincoln replied, “No, they will eat each other.”

Well, the new president and the new secretary of state were not only political rivals and very unlike personalities, they also had very different ideas on how to deal with the crisis. Seward thought the Union could still be patched up. When it couldn’t be patched up, he argued that United States ought to pick a quarrel with one of the major European powers — say Britain — and that would bring everybody together against the common foe.

As for Lincoln, there is no evidence that he had virtually any thoughts on foreign policy at all before he became president. We know that he opposed the Mexican War. His speech, however, is a semi-legal treatise arguing that President Van Buren was either ignorant or deluded. There is no reference to foreign policy, per se. He never gave a speech on the topic and never uttered anything that anybody thought important to recall. So as far as foreign policy was concerned, Lincoln was a blank slate.

The team began badly. April 1, 1861, must rank as one of the most amazing April Fool’s Days in our history. For on that day, Seward did two things. He wrote a letter to Lincoln, saying that it was clear that despite the crisis there was no policy direction in the Cabinet. So Seward proposed that while Lincoln remain President, he should announce that, henceforth, the conduct of affairs would be controlled by the undersigned, Mr. Seward. Now on that same day, Lincoln had authorized the preparation of an expedition in New York to reinforce Fort Sumter. There was another fort, Fort Pickens in Florida, that was also in danger, but Fort Sumter was in much worse shape. Seward thought it was a very bad idea to reinforce Sumter, lest this provoke a war. Consequently, he promptly had orders written out in the name of the Secretary of War and the President of the United States indicating that the expedition should go to Fort Pickens. He slipped the papers among others that were full of appointments, and taking advantage of Lincoln’s busy schedule, insisted that all had to be signed immediately, which Lincoln did, unaware of their contents. Apprised by the secretary of the navy of the change, Lincoln later countermanded the order.

Now, just imagine all of this happening on the same day, and yet Lincoln did not fire Seward! Instead, he wrote a letter to him saying in effect that yes, it was true that there should be one person in charge of giving the lead and, as Lincoln put it, “I suppose that person is me.” He thanked Seward for his advice and signed off. Nor did he chastise Seward for the substitution of the papers. Judging that Seward’s dismissal at that point would have been catastrophic for his political situation, he did something else, defended him to the Cabinet while taking the blame because he’d been careless in examining his papers. This saved Seward’s honor and cemented their relationship. And it would not be the last time that Lincoln would defend him. Confronted with the kind of insubordination that must have boiled his blood, Lincoln subordinated his emotions to his principle of unity.

Let me move now to the second part of the discussion, the Lincoln-Seward foreign policy in action. At the time of the Civil War, highly flexible alliance systems, determined by balance of power calculations, characterized world politics, not unfamiliar to us today but with fewer participants. Britain, France, and Russia were the great powers and the Austrian and Ottoman Empires held second rank. Germany and Italy did not exist as unified states.

None of the great powers had alliances with the United States, but they all had very important commercial relations. We all know about the South’s “king cotton,” which constituted about four-fifths of the European supply (about 80 percent in France, 75 percent in Britain). These were the feedstocks of the then-existing industrial revolution in consumer products, namely, clothing. But there was also something called “king grain,”

which was less remarked upon; the Midwestern states were already major sources of food for Europe. Finally, the anti-slavery movement had real political strength throughout Europe, including not only Britain and France but also Russia. In 1861, the Czar, Alexander the II, had emancipated the serfs. All the American abolitionists were terminally embarrassed. Their own democracy with its Declaration of Independence — all men are created equal — seemed unable to end slavery, but in the least free and most autocratic state in Europe, Czarist Russia, the slaves had been freed!

The Americans approached this situation from several viewpoints. Acutely aware of the French role in securing the American independence, they sympathized with that country against England but on the whole were bound to neutrality. The United States did not take sides when the European powers went to war with each other; we stayed out of it. (When we did not, as in the War of 1812, it had been disastrous, the British bombarding New York and burning Washington, something not to be repeated until September 11, 2001.)

Finally, there was the Monroe Doctrine, intended to keep European quarrels out of the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine itself had not always been enforced very well, but there it was, and everybody had been brought up on it. As you will see, Lincoln disregarded all three: neutrality, sympathy for France, and the Monroe Doctrine.

With this background, let us now examine Lincoln's and Seward's first foray into foreign policy. The President had endorsed the so-called "Anaconda strategy," to defeat the rebellion, not by invasion but rather by strangulation through restriction on transportation and trade. Oddly enough, the Southerners, at the very outset, declared that they would no longer export cotton, hoping to force the European powers to come to their aid before they faced economic ruin. Thanks to three earlier years of bumper crops, however, all of the European countries had very large stocks in reserve. So for Lincoln and Seward, this was the ideal moment to close the ring by declaring a blockade immediately after the fall of Fort Sumter. (April 19th, 1861.)

Unfortunately, although Seward and Lincoln were both trained as lawyers, their knowledge of international law was defective. They were ignorant of the Treaty of London of 1857, which was designed to establish a more regulated neutrality after the Crimean War. (The United States did not sign it.) Under this Treaty, if you declared that you were neutral regarding the belligerents, you were also taking a long step towards recognizing the belligerents as states. So when Lincoln and Seward declared a blockade, they were inadvertently pushing the other powers to recognize the Confederacy, the exact opposite of their objective, which was to stigmatize the south as mere rebels. When this was pointed out, Seward tried to hold off a British declaration by suggesting the United States might sign the treaty. It did not work. On May 13th, London announced neutrality. Seward exploded ("God damn them") and suggested to Lincoln that war with Britain might still work to recover the South. Lincoln's rejoinder, "One war at a time," might be called the President's prime diplomatic directive.

The postscript to this incident came on July 4, 1861, when Lincoln, a very good lawyer, found a solution to the problem. On that day he asked the Congress for retroactive approval of all the measures he had taken since the capture of Fort Sumter. Now mind you, he had raised forces, he had declared war in effect. He had suspended the writ of habeas corpus. He had done all sorts of things which were not constitutional. Congress hadn't approved any of them. Now he was asking them on July 4th for retroactive approval, including this line: "Among the measures is the closing of ports in the manner of a blockade." Not a blockade but in the "manner of a blockade!" So in this way Lincoln sought to retract the original declaration and its international legal consequences.

The problem of defining the combatants, however, would not go away. (Sound familiar?) This becomes clear in my second case, the so-called "Trent Affair," (November 8-December 26, 1861). The Confederate States of America had sent to London as their agent one James T. Bullock (the uncle of Theodore Roosevelt on his mother's side). Bullock was a very effective arms buyer, but not much of a diplomat, so he needed help. And two commissioners, Mason and Slidell, were put aboard a British ship, H.M.S. Trent. This ship was intercepted by the Union Navy, and at point of force, Mason and Slidell were removed. The United States had gone to war in 1812 because the British were doing such things to us. Now, just as we didn't want neutrality to be carefully

defined, we were doing the very things we had always denounced the Europeans for doing. This outraged Britain and worsened the Union's already poor reputation in London.

Here is an interesting sidelight on the war for public opinion that also rings modern. The foremost foreign correspondent of the day was one William H. Russell, who wrote for the London Times. When he arrived in Washington (March 26, 1861), Lincoln and Seward wined and dined him. Initially, this paid off. The British upper classes sympathized with the "aristocratic South," the civilized Americans, as opposed to the money-grubbing Yankees of the North. Russell went to a dress ball at Charleston where he met the cream of the South, and related his conversations to the readers of the London Times. The "aristocrats" wanted to know why he wasn't carrying a pistol, which apparently the better folk of the South considered to be absolutely necessary. They also instructed him that he should get one of sufficient caliber to stop a man dead in his tracks, because if you didn't, he might get a shot off at you as he fell dying! So much for the civilized South.

Lincoln and Seward were mighty pleased until Russell reported on the first Battle of Manassas — also known as Bull Run — in July 1861, describing accurately the Union's overconfidence and chaotic retreat. Now the President and Secretary of State were not happy about Mr. Russell, and they said so. He didn't like that either, and for the balance of the war, the editorials of the London Times were hostile to the Union in general, and to Lincoln, in particular.

Special measures were needed to change this situation. Lincoln authorized a delegation consisting of two clergymen — one Catholic, one Episcopalian — plus Seward's chief political backer, Thurlow Weed, to work with the U.S. Ambassador Charles Francis Adams (of the famous Adams family) to plead the Union cause. Seward did not entirely trust Adams who thought he, not Seward, was more fitting to be secretary of state. And the Ambassador also had a deadly pen, describing his boss as having the manners and appearance of a parrot. (The photographs show that he wasn't too far off.) Seward wasn't the only personage to suffer from Adams. When Charles Darwin published his theory that species evolve for the better, Adams quipped: "The evolution of the American presidency from Washington to Buchanan should have given Mr. Darwin pause!"

Fortunately for the United States, the British had a very experienced team. The Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell (no relation to the reporter) had been Prime Minister, and while he was Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston had been his Foreign Secretary. By 1861, Palmerston had become the Prime Minister and Russell the Foreign Secretary. Russell, unlike Seward, was a very calm and cold character. Palmerston, unlike Lincoln, was a fairly excitable man. He also had a reputation for violent action as in the Don Pacifico affair (1850), when he threatened to bombard Athens over the mistreatment of a British citizen. Apparently discounting the American amateurs, they had until now not taken too much offense. They were not interested in conflict with the United States. On the Trent affair, however, they could not concede or temporize. So, on December 11, 1861, since the United States had made no move to release Mason or Slidell, they gave the Americans an ultimatum: release the men, or Britain would be at war with the United States.

Lincoln and Seward got a little more time when on December 16th, Prince Albert, Queen Victoria's consort, unexpectedly died. Ten days later, Mason and Slidell were returned to British custody, while Lincoln and Seward both made statements indicating that this was out of their own largess, but legally speaking, they could have still held the rebels for the duration. Once again, "one war at a time."

For the second time in a year, Lincoln and Seward had evaded a showdown with Europe. But Lincoln's diplomacy continued to suffer from a disabling doubt. It didn't look like the Union would win any time soon. And as the war dragged on, how long could the European powers stay out of it?

That leads us to the third and last of the major dangers that Lincoln and Seward faced in their foreign policy, the potential for international mediation. And this took up much of 1862. It was also the year when, of all things, at the hands of our friends, the French, the Monroe Doctrine went down. There was a problem on our southern border. The Mexican government had been improvident — borrowed a lot of money and couldn't pay it back.

In the nineteenth century (and even into part of the twentieth century) if a sovereign country defaulted on its debts, you didn't get an International Monetary Fund mission, you got an invasion to seize the assets till the money was paid off. The Mexicans were heavily in debt. The Spanish, the French, and the British were the principal creditors and they had been threatening military action for a year.

In early January 1862, Britain and Spain dropped out, and France invaded Mexico. This was as clear a violation of the Monroe Doctrine as could be imagined. Lincoln indicated to the Mexican government that the United States could offer no assistance whatsoever — one war at a time. And so the Monroe Doctrine now joined neutrality, and sympathy with the French, as principles sacrificed to the overriding priority — subduing the South.

It was also now very clear to the Europeans that the American conflict would not be brief. There were huge forces in the field in the beginning of 1862, on the Union side alone one-half million or more and growing every day. In the meantime, the blockade was proving effective in throttling southern cotton exports and the European surpluses of the previous years had disappeared.

Lincoln was very anxious, as was Seward, to turn the tide of European opinion, especially in Britain. Refusing at first to act on the slavery issue in the hope of returning the South to the Union, he began to move in 1862 toward what would become the Emancipation Proclamation. This would greatly improve the Union's reputation in public opinion, particularly in Britain.

Lincoln's proximate purpose was to head off a major move by the European powers to stop the war. Now, whether they could have actually done so was another matter, but their mediation would have entailed, by definition, their recognition of the Confederate States of America. The Union arguments made little headway until the battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862, accounted by most Europeans as a northern victory. And that was followed twelve days later by Lincoln's "Emancipation Proclamation." This one-two punch broke the movement toward mediation and it did not come a moment too soon.

In late summer 1862, British Foreign Secretary Lord Russell had concluded that perhaps it was in the British interest to get the war stopped. He put up a trial balloon through a parliamentary ally, the future Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone. Gladstone made a speech (October 7, 1862) congratulating the southerners for their success against tremendous odds in holding off the North; they have made an army, he said, and more importantly, "they have made a nation," which meant they were deserving of recognition. Almost simultaneously, the French, perhaps also prompted by Russell, called for mediation. Well, Palmerston was too old of a goat not to know that he was being maneuvered. He said that he was in favor of mediation but only by all the European powers, not simply the British or the French but also Russia so that no one's motives might be questioned. The Russians and the Americans, at that time, had a love affair. The Czar lacked both the forces and the inclination to offend the Union; he declined the mediation. Thus strengthened, Palmerston secured a Cabinet vote of 15-3 against any initiative.

Afterwards, Palmerston declared, "The pugilists must fight a few more rounds before the bystanders can decide that the state should be divided between them." That was a very significant diplomatic statement, because it said, in effect, the winner of the war would determine what everybody else did. And when he said "the state should be divided between them," he very clearly put the Confederate States of America into the position of rebels, not an independent factor. So with that vote, the possibility of European intervention beyond the French trespass in Mexico disappeared. Very soon, changes in Europe — the stirring of the Germans and the Italians and a revolt in Poland — overtook the American drama. The moment for mediation had passed.

This incident was attended by no little irony. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine had been aimed against the Russians, then holding Alaska, not only the Spanish and French. Forty-odd years later, the Czar facilitated the restoration of the Monroe Doctrine by refusing to involve Russia in some kind of mediation that would have recognized the southern states.

Let me close by summing up these incidents and drawing some conclusions that may be relevant to us. Lincoln entered office completely innocent of foreign policy, and yet, as happened in the military field, and certainly in the political field, he turned out to be a quick learner with an innate gift for understanding the relationship of subordinate actions to an overall strategy. But he did not learn before his mistakes; he learned after his mistakes. In 1861-62, Lincoln and Seward committed their share of severe blunders that, if not for an experienced team in Britain, might indeed have brought the United States into a second war. Having learned from those blunders, they were never repeated. And I think that's because Lincoln, by that time, had already formulated in his mind a set of simple propositions.

First, the objective was the preservation of the Union through the defeat of the South and everything else was subordinate to that. Anybody familiar with strategy knows that if you lack that clear priority at the outset, it's very, very hard to coordinate the different tactics and indeed the tactics, sooner or later, come to dominate the strategy. That didn't happen with Lincoln. He had that one objective, and whether it was neutrality or the Monroe Doctrine, they would be sacrificed to it.

Second, he had an overriding operational principle — one war at a time. Anything likely to lead the United States in the direction of another war, the President would prevent as best he understood it.

Third and finally — last, but not least — he developed a very effective foreign policy team through his relationship with Seward. You know the expression “the slip twixt lip and cup.” You can have the right idea, you can have the right strategy, but unless you've got the team that can actually pull it off, it's going to be a tragedy. After the rockiest start of any relationship between a president and secretary of state in our history, the Lincoln-Seward team became extraordinarily proficient in doing what they had to do.

Let me give you a little postscript to this relationship. In December of 1862, because the war was going on much longer than anybody expected, there was a Cabinet revolt, as well as a revolt amongst the Republicans in Congress over the operation of the Cabinet. The Secretary of War Simon Cameron, a notoriously corrupt Pennsylvania politician, had proved to be even too corrupt for those corrupt times, and he was forced out. Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase led the cry for Seward's head. Lincoln agreed to change the Cabinet on condition that they all submitted their resignations first. Well, Chase wasn't about to chance that, and so the revolt fizzled, and it never happened again. When Lincoln was asked to explain the situation by his private secretary, he told this story:

A farmer was troubled by a problem with skunks, and one day he noticed Mother Skunk escorting six of her progeny across his property. So he shot one of them. Now the man hearing this story said to the farmer, “Why didn't you shoot all of them?” to which the farmer replied, “Well one stink was enough!”

Seward, by the end of the Civil War, was considered the second man in the government. He, along with Lincoln, was marked for assassination and suffered a severe stab wound. Recovering, he stayed on as Secretary of State under Andrew Johnson, arranging to purchase Alaska from the Russians, called at the time, “Seward's folly.”

As for Lincoln himself, I would close by offering you this appraisal from a columnist in an Austrian newspaper. Writing in 1863, the author declared that America meant “the well-intentioned common man can succeed.” Although he considered Lincoln to be such a man he concluded by saying, “Lincoln will take his place directly next to Washington.” It was perhaps Karl Marx's most accurate prediction.

Harvey Sicherman, Ph.D., is President of FPRI (<http://www.fpri.org>) and a former aide to three U.S. secretaries of state. This essay is based on remarks made in February before an audience of FPRI members. This article is reprinted with permission.

*The New York Times***Opinionator**

OCTOBER 2, 2011, 11:38 PM

Why Bismarck Loved Lincoln

By KENNETH WEISBRODE

Disunion follows the Civil War as it unfolded.

Tags:

abraham lincoln, giuseppe garibaldi, Otto von Bismarck, the civil war

We usually think of the Civil War as a uniquely American event, a war unlike any other fought in the Western world during the 19th century. And of course that's true, strictly speaking: no other country saw itself split in two over slavery. But that's not the only way to think of the war. Put a different way, the Civil War was just one of several wars for national unification — including fighting in Italy and Germany — on both sides of the Atlantic during the mid-19th century.

While countries like Britain and France were concentrating on expansion through colonization, the United States, Germany and others were focused inward, developing — intentionally or not — the centralizing powers that have defined the modern state ever since. What seems like a particularly American event was really part of a much larger, and much more significant, historical trend.

As a war of national unification, the Civil War represented a sharp historical break, a moment of crisis that would define the country's course for decades to come. Beforehand, the notions of national unification and expansion had been indivisible: just 15 years prior, the United States defeated Mexico in a bloody war that brought vast territories under occupation and destroyed the delicate balance between slave and free states. Some people predicted the worst. "The United States will conquer Mexico," claimed Ralph Waldo Emerson in 1846, "but it will be as the man swallows the arsenic which brings him down in turn. Mexico will poison us." Ulysses S. Grant went so far as to declare the Civil War divine punishment for the Mexican conflict.

Indeed, the Mexican War fueled an ongoing debate about how large the country should get. Canada, or parts of

Library of Congress
Maximilian,
Emperor of Mexico

Canada, had been sought by eager expansionists virtually since the two parts of British North America went their separate ways in 1776; spreading the plantation economy to Mexico and beyond — the so-called purple dream — had long animated the Southern imagination.

Even as the Civil War began, Mexico continued to fester and tempt interventionists. It announced in mid-July 1861 that it could not service its debts, having just ended its own civil war (called the War of the Reform), and so suspended payments to its European creditors. This was not unusual, but this time the country's creditors did more than reiterate demands for payment: the British, French and Spanish governments joined forces in October to compel Mexico to pay; by the end of the year the city of Vera Cruz was occupied.

The British and the Spanish soon reversed course, but Napoleon III of France, in league with Mexican reactionaries, persevered: he sought nothing less than a new Catholic empire in the Western Hemisphere under his auspices (thence the term "Latin" America). French troops occupied Mexico City and installed a Hapsburg archduke, Maximilian, as emperor. He lasted until 1867 when, having lost the war against his opponents and even the backing of Napoleon, he was executed by a Mexican firing squad.

Here, then, was a major challenge to Washington, an act of aggression in the Western Hemisphere by European countries and thus a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Some in Abraham Lincoln's administration may have urged him to strike, to invade Mexico and push the Europeans out before they dug in. But Lincoln rejected any such advice.

In part it was a matter of expediency; the Union had more pressing matters to its south to deal with. But it was also a resetting of the course of the American state. As Lincoln saw it, "older" powers like Britain, France and Russia could go on to see imperial archipelagos flourish, but "younger" states should opt for geographic and political consolidation and centralization at home. Lincoln thus rebuffed the idea of conquering and colonizing Canadians and Mexicans in favor of building a new nation to the Pacific. It's no surprise that Lincoln would prefer this path: as a Midwesterner, his mental map extended more horizontally than vertically — east to west rather than north to south. But first he had to stop the American South from going its own way.

Lincoln wasn't alone in prioritizing centralization. Giuseppe Garibaldi and his fellow campaigners for Italy's unification — which had just been proclaimed in March — would have understood this, as would nationalists (sometimes called "unitarios") elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, notably in Argentina, Colombia and Canada, whose confederation debate got going at about the same time. As a matter of fact, Lincoln authorized a commission for Garibaldi in the Union Army. Garibaldi turned it down — evidently because freeing the slaves was not yet sufficiently high on the list of the Union's war aims — yet Lincoln's offer underscores the fellowship between America's war of unification and those taking place in other parts of the world.

Perhaps no one was more in tune with Lincoln than Otto von Bismarck, the minister-president of Prussia. Beginning in 1862, Bismarck unified Germany, but he explicitly rejected the idea of a

Library of Congress
Otto Fürst
von Bismarck

“Großdeutschland,” or “Greater Germany,” incorporating Austria, in favor of a “kleindeutsche Lösung,” or “Little German Solution,” that preferred centralization over maximum territorial expansion. This may have been one reason why, after the Civil War ended, Bismarck reportedly sounded out Washington on an alliance. It made sense: Europe’s rising industrial and military power seeking common cause with an American counterpart that seemed destined for the same.

Unifying states needed more than just will; they needed propitious events and conditions. In Germany’s case, it was the Crimean War — triggered, incidentally, by Napoleon III, following his 1851 coup — that made unification possible by putting an end to the Anglo-Russian condominium underpinning the European, and therefore global, balance of power. In the United States it was the country’s “free” security (provided in large measure by the British Navy) that allowed for its territorial expansion and consolidation.

And so the old order gave way to a new, contested one on both sides of the Atlantic; unification would come in both places by force. If the Crimean War had set the stage for the wars of unification in Germany and Italy, and the Mexican War did so for the war of unification in the United States, then it’s worth asking: if there had been no Crimean War, might there still have been an American Civil War? Probably so; civil wars by definition happen largely for internal reasons. But without the conflict in Europe, the American war would not have been the nationalist achievement of world-historical import, as Lincoln, Bismarck and later generations understood it.

In other words, the Civil War — as significant as it is for American history — is even more important when viewed through a comparative, transatlantic lens. The fight for internal unification rather than expansion meant that never again would the United States seek to conquer and annex its neighbors. It would, along with Bismarck’s Germany, be a new kind of state: centralized, rationalized and mobilized to dominate the coming century.

Follow Disunion at twitter.com/NYTCivilWar or join us on Facebook.

Kenneth Weisbrode is a writer and historian. His latest book is “The Atlantic Century.”

Related Disunion Highlights

Explore multimedia from the series and navigate through past posts, as well as photos and articles from the Times archive.

• [See the Highlights »](#)

Sign In Register Print Subscription Conversations Today's Paper

Go

POLITICS OPINIONS LOCAL SPORTS National World Business Investigations L

Books
Celebrities
Comics
Going Out Guide
Horoscopes

Movies
Make us your start page
Museums
Puzzles
Theater & Dance
TV


Top Blogs

Reliable Source | Roxanne Roberts & Amy Arget
TV Column | Lisa de Moraes
Celebrity | Jen Chaney
Click Track | Chris Richards & David Malitz

D.C. Maryland Virginia Crime Education On Faith/Local Obituaries Traffic & Commuting W

In the News Tuition prices Teenager shot 'Hippie High' Freedom Plaza protests Forecast

connect face-to-face with
new high quality video



A House Divided

News and views about the 150th anniversary of the American Civil War

Ongoing Civil War coverage | Our Civil War panel of experts | Tweeting the War

ABOUT THIS BLOG

"A House Divided" is a blog dedicated to news and issues of importance to Civil War enthusiasts across the country and around the world. Blogger Linda Wheeler and a panel of respected Civil War experts will debate and dissect historical issues and explore new concepts. Wheeler will also report on conferences and seminars, find little-known battlefields and sites to explore, keep track of local, national and international stories of interest to readers and provide advice on upcoming events.

About the Blogger

LINDA'S FAVORITE SITES

Civil War Interactive
Newswire

Posted at 04:19 PM ET, 10/08/2011

Untold Civil War stories: Lincoln's impact abroad

By Frank J. Williams

Our panel of Civil War experts returns to A House Divided to mull more questions during the war's 150th anniversary. Our latest question: What is the most important but overlooked story of the Civil War?



WILLIAMS

There is one slice of Civil War history which has been largely overlooked by American historians and the public, and that is when the outside world began to pay attention to Abraham Lincoln's unique leadership style.

We do know that from the start that Abraham Lincoln saw the war as a "people's contest" testing whether self-government was viable in a largely colonial and monarchical world. For Lincoln, the test was whether a determined minority could undermine a majoritarian system of government. Most of his public utterances echoed the theme that the American Civil War should be viewed within a world perspective. And, amazingly enough, the peoples of the world heeded his words and behavior.

Cenantua's Blog
 Civil War Memory
 Civil War History
 Rantings of a Civil War
 Historian
 Civil Warriors
 TOCWOC
 American Civil War
 Stories

CONTACT US

E-mail Us

SEARCH THIS BLOG

Go

SUBSCRIBE

Select ...

RECENT POSTS

Untold Civil War stories:
 Goodbye, gold standard
 Untold Civil War stories:
 Lincoln's impact abroad
 Untold Civil War stories:
 The tactical defeat that
 became a strategic
 victory
 Untold Civil War stories:
 The Potomac blockade
 Exhibit on the Civil War
 and religion, and other
 upcoming events

Entries By Category
 150th anniversary
 A House Divided
 Battlefields
 News
 Re-enactments
 Tweeting the war
 Views

Stories By Date
 Full Monthly Archive

Thanks to the work of the International Lincoln Center at Louisiana State University, Shreveport, considerable field research has been done in this area. The Center has looked at Lincoln's impact abroad.

In 1861, the Republic of San Marino tended citizenship to Lincoln. The president, in thanking them for the honor, remarked, "...you have kindly averted to the trial through which the Republic is now passing. ...It involves the question of whether a Representative republic...can save itself from the dangers of domestic faction. I have faith in a good result."

As early as 1861-1862, Europeans were learning to appreciate him even earlier than commonly believed and much earlier than Lincoln's many critics in the press and in politics at home where his leadership remained an open target until his assassination. As Paul Clerkin points out in "Dublin Street Names" (2001), the Irish had already named a street for him in Dublin early in 1862- long before their independence from England after World War I. It became the first street in the world named for him. Though the American public would not elect an Irish Catholic president until a century later, Lincoln held no grudge against one's race and religion.

He had been against the Mexican-American war while serving in Congress, he articulated a moral basis against slavery in the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and in his appointments he reflected an appreciation for all people regardless of race, religion and nationality. He walked the talk of a genuine liberator around the world then and now.

Around the world there are now more streets named for Lincoln than for any other American president as people of many other countries take him for their own.

Frank J. Williams is the founding chair of the Lincoln Forum and chair of the Rhode Island Civil War sesquicentennial Commemoration Commission. In 2009 he moderated a panel at the Oxford University conference on the Global Lincoln.

Read more from [The Washington Post's Civil War special section](#)

By Frank J. Williams | 04:19 PM ET, 10/08/2011

Recommend

7

Share

Previous: [Untold Civil War stories: Goodbye, gold standard](#)

Next: [Untold Civil War stories: The tactical defeat that became a strategic victory](#)


Co

The Trent Affair: Lincoln's First Foreign Policy Crisis

By William Shepherd
ALA Board Member and
Membership Chairman

On November 8, 1861, the British packet ship, the *Trent*, was sailing through international waters in the Bahama Channel in the Caribbean Sea. In addition to its usual cargo of mail and dispatches, the *Trent* passengers included two Confederate envoys en route to Europe. They were James Mason and John Slidell, both former U.S. Senators, both "fire-eaters" for the slaveholder cause. Their mission was to obtain recognition of the Confederacy from England and France.

Appearing over the horizon was the Union warship, the *San Jacinto*, captained by the unpredictable John Wilkes. Wilkes ordered that the *Trent* be boarded by force; Mason and Slidell were taken off the *Trent* and transported as prisoners to Fort Warren, near Boston Harbor.



James Murray Mason, Confederate envoy to Europe, former U.S. Senator, and advocate for the slaveholder cause.
Photograph courtesy of the Senate Historical Office.

The capture and imprisonment of Mason and Slidell were greeted with great enthusiasm in the North, which had only heard the bad news from Bull Run, Wilson's Creek and Ball's Bluff. At last, the North had tasted victory over the South, albeit mostly symbolic with the capture of two aged noncombatants.

It took nineteen days for the actions of Captain Wilkes to reach London by mail. (the Trans-Atlantic cable installed in 1858 between England and the United



FRANKLIN WILKES, noticing by the last Number of *Harper's Weekly* that the well-known Rogers, Mason and Slidell, were about to pawn some of their late Employer's property at New York, (and, indeed, at a Shop, kept a bright look-out for such, and nabbed) ran to the nick of time.

States was inoperable). The British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, was incensed at the provocation made upon a neutral ship flying the British Union Jack in international waters. The British government's saber rattling was immediate. British troops were to be dispatched to Canada. War plans for the bombardment of the Northern cities were drafted. British exports to the Union munitions factories ceased. Lord Palmerston instructed his Foreign Minister, Lord John Russell, to send a message of indignation and belligerence to the Union government. Prince Albert, who was nearly dead from illness, interceded and toned down the message to Secretary of State William Seward.

Back in Washington, D.C., the Union exuberance at this small "victory" was not shared by President Lincoln. He quickly realized that capturing the Confederate traitors Mason and Slidell would be of no lasting consequence, unless it was negative. To Lincoln, Mason and Slidell were "white elephants" that could precipitate a conflict with England. Lincoln knew that the Union could only "fight one war at a time." Lincoln enlisted the assistance of a Philadelphia newspaper editor to help explain the predicament of the Union, namely that Mason and Slidell were not worth a war with England which likely would make it impossible to also defeat the Confederates. The article did make the case that it was wise to step back from the brink of war with England.

On December 19, the British response to the *Trent* Affair was given to Secretary Seward by Lord Lyons, the British Minister to the Union government. The message demanded the immediate release of Mason and Slidell and the payment of indemnities and an apology from the Union. If a favorable response was not forthcoming from the Union, then Lord Lyons would be called home to London immediately, a prelude to war.

President Lincoln called an emergency cabinet meeting for Christmas Day to formulate a response to this largely unanticipated vigorous British set of demands. Seward had incorrectly expected a mild response followed by lengthy diplomatic negotiations. Suddenly, the Lincoln administration found itself in a dangerous and difficult foreign entanglement. Refusing to release the two Confederates would lead to war with England. Releasing them would make Lincoln look too compliant with British demands.



Slidell, John

John Slidell, Confederate envoy to Europe, former U.S. Senator, and advocate for the slaveholder cause.
Photograph courtesy of the Library of Congress.

As the Union cabinet considered all the evidence and the applicable law of the *Trent* Affair on that Christmas day, consensus grew that Captain Wilkes had acted illegally under international maritime law; he also acted without the knowledge or prior approval of his command. Therefore, Mason and Slidell must be released and allowed to complete their diplomatic mission. The Palmerston government conceded on the indemnities

(Continued on page 5)

Lincoln Home National Historic Site

George L. Painter Looking for Lincoln Lectures

Lincoln's Illinois Goes to War

February 12, 2012 8:30 a.m.



By Tim Townsend

Historian at Lincoln Home National Historic Site and former member of the ALA Board of Directors

Lincoln Home National Historic Site invites the public to attend the *George L. Painter Looking for Lincoln Lectures* on Sunday, February 12, 2012, at 8:30 a.m. at the Lincoln Home National Historic Site Visitor Center, 426 South Seventh Street, Springfield, Illinois. The Visitor Center will open one half hour early, at 8:00 a.m.

Lincoln Home National Historic Site is pleased to present this annual lecture series in partnership with the Abraham Lincoln

National Heritage Area also known as the "Looking for Lincoln Heritage coalition." Together, Lincoln Home and Looking for Lincoln will present stories that focus on the central Illinois communities that Lincoln impacted or that impacted Lincoln. The theme for the 2012 lectures is *Lincoln's Illinois Goes to War* in honor of the 150th anniversary of the Civil War. This year's lectures will focus on how Clinton, Jacksonville, and Decatur Illinois contributed to the Civil War effort. The speakers for each community presentation will be announced soon.

In addition, the lectures will feature a presentation by acclaimed central Illinois pho-

tographer Robert Shaw, who will talk about his new book *Abraham Lincoln Traveled This Way*. This richly illustrated book explores the places and the land that were a part of Abraham Lincoln's life through Shaw's beautiful photography and commentary by award winning Lincoln historian Michael Burlingame. Mr. Shaw will be available for a book signing following the program.

Anyone wishing to obtain further information regarding the *George L. Painter Looking for Lincoln Lectures* is welcome to contact Lincoln Home National Historic Site at 217-391-3221.

(Continued from page 4)

payment and apology issue.

A major foreign policy crisis (and perhaps war with England) was resolved peacefully by President Lincoln. His decision making in the Trent Affair demonstrated his continual focus on achieving his war aims and not getting sidetracked into a dispute over the rights of a neutral power in international waters. Lincoln was restrained while others around him (especially Seward) were celebrating their Anglophobia. Lincoln ignored the Trent Affair in his December 1861 Message to Congress (now known as the State of the Union), thereby cooling rather than inflaming the passions of the North. And perhaps most significantly, Lincoln denied the Jeff Davis government in Richmond what they wanted most, the British navy breaking the blockade of southern ports. Lincoln was shrewd and deliberate in his handling of the Trent Affair, 150 years ago.

Sources: *Abraham Lincoln: A Life* by Michael Burlingame (2008).

A World On Fire: Britain's Crucial Role In The American Civil War by Amanda Foreman (2011).

President Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman by William Lee Miller (2008).



Christmas Boxes in Camp—Christmas, 1861.
Harper's Weekly SATURDAY, JANUARY 4, 1862.

EDITION: UK

[CA Canada](#) [Québec](#) [FR France](#) [US United States](#) [UK United Kingdom](#)

- [Charles Dickens](#)

[More](#)

[Log in](#) | [Create Account](#)

13 March 2012

HUFFPOST CULTURE

UNITED KINGDOM 

[Like](#)

689

[This is the print preview: Back to normal view »](#)



[J.L. Sirisuk](#)

LA/NY/UK based writer

[GET UPDATES FROM J.L. Sirisuk](#)

[Like](#)

1

Historical Mates: Lancashire and Abraham Lincoln

Posted: 10/03/2012 00:00

[Follow](#)

>

[Culture](#), [Politics](#), [Abraham Lincoln](#), [American Civil War](#), [United States](#), [America](#), [Civil War](#), [Cotton](#), [History](#), [Manchester](#), [President Lincoln](#), [UK Culture News](#)

Whilst the 150th anniversary of the American civil war continues to provoke considerable debate and a range of commemorative events, I am reminded of the war's impact on a specific part of the world - though one not located within the 50 US states, but across the Atlantic. Tucked away in a quiet section of Manchester stands a bronze statue of Abraham Lincoln, his very presence encapsulating a civil war link which many Britons are unaware of - one that significantly altered the historical landscapes of both America and the north west of England.

Discovering Lincoln's statue in Manchester initially perplexed me. Questioning those around me, I came to realise that whilst many people were oblivious to the existence of the statue, those who recalled having seen it remained unaware of its significance. The more I learned of Lincoln's relationship with Lancashire, the deeper my own bond became. Hence I took a closer look at my adopted city.

To look closely at the buildings of Manchester is to discover the remnants of a time when the city was known as Cottonopolis and the cotton spinning mills thrived. A majority of the surviving mills have been converted into lofts and office spaces, their former existence as textile factories buried under years of history and societal change. There endures a prideful awareness amongst northerners of the cotton famine and the

subsequent downfall of Lancashire's reign as cotton king - an understanding of the impoverishment and severe changes to northern society that stemmed from the eventual collapse of its industrial lifeblood.

The resulting economic depression came as a consequence of the American civil war, rooted in the Union's proclamation of a Blockade Against Southern Ports. On 19 April, 1861 Lincoln officially authorised the Federal Navy to block southern Confederate ports throughout the war - a decision that would drastically alter the landscape of American and British history. Relying on the southern Confederate states for supplies of raw cotton, Lancashire experienced a severe depression as the cotton industry - the foundation of northern economic stability - began to deteriorate.

Although Britain adopted a neutral position during the war, there was a temptation to support the southern American states in their determination to secede from the Union. For the southern states to secede and retain control of their ports would, after all, lead to a replenishment of cotton and the rebirth of an industry. But the blockade of imported cotton was no longer at the heart of Lancashire's focus - instead the very origins of the cotton itself, grown and picked by slaves, become the fundamental issue. During a period of brutal hardship and an uncertain future, the people of Lancashire demonstrated integrity and a deep sense of loyalty to a cause whose importance came before immediate access to cotton: the abolition of American slavery.

On 31 December, 1862 the working people of Manchester voiced their support with the Union:

...the vast progress which you have made in the short space of 20 months fills us with hope that every stain on your freedom will shortly be removed, and that the erasure of that foul blot on civilisation and Christianity - chattel slavery - during your presidency, will cause the name of Abraham Lincoln to be honoured and revered by posterity. We are certain that such a glorious consummation will cement Great Britain and the United States in close and enduring regards.

In a letter to the people of Lancashire dated 19 January, 1863 Lincoln wrote the following response:

I hail this interchange of sentiments, therefore, as an augury that, whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exists between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual.

And so an American President and the people of Lancashire formed a pivotal union, establishing a relationship that fundamentally changed the cultural and political landscapes of both countries. The Lancashire cotton famine and the American civil war remain inextricably linked - and it was during this specific period of shared history that a meaningful and integral connection developed between Lincoln and the people of Lancashire.

FOLLOW US

-
-
-
-
-
-
-

Connect with your friends
Check out stories you might like,
and see what your friends are sharing!



Most Popular

5EKAbhxJzNvhFsN15cgH837STM5nlrCTThd4cgoQjLPJx6xBF9GnhANwTNgCPWUjKVM41i9R6rLUFkRnZ0HjuWcE6YTHdt%2B%2B
R8WxT25nrKIBbp40NGADVXRL%2FmlqfbOXHaUv8ou4eLtz3oRr9XXQBW%2F9nWfu5VBdRimlyBEgXcGOJDmJqFrLFi7fvXB0Rm%2F
1 of 2

Carnage In Afghanistan As US Soldier Goes On The Rampage

Recommend

671

WATCH: Power Station Towers Demolished In Explosion

Like

The Popularity of Abraham Lincoln In Western Europe

The name "Abraham Lincoln" has always had a revered place in the minds of the people of Western Europe. His image as the symbol of the free man has led to the publication of over 200 Lincoln books and pamphlets in the different languages of Europe (not including English.) since 1860.

England

Lincoln's greatest popularity, outside the United States, is of course in England. H. G. Wells, the famous English historian, named Lincoln as one of the six great world figures--the others were Jesus of Nazareth, Buddha, Asoka, Aristotle, Roger Bacon.

Two heroic bronze statues of Lincoln are today located in London (St. Gaudens) and Manchester (Barnard), England. A Lincoln bronze statue by Bissell is located in Edinburgh, Scotland.

In 1959, the Lincoln Sesquicentennial celebration year, a wreath laying ceremony took place on February 12th at the foot of the Lincoln statue in London's Parliament Square. Prime Minister Macmillan, U. S. Ambassador Whitney, and other leaders of Parliament attended and participated in the program which attracted television, newsreel, radio and national press coverage. On the same

date a similar observance was held in Manchester where the Lord Mayor and the U. S. Consul General placed a wreath at Lincoln's statue.

In 1930 and 1933 Dr. Louis A. Warren published two Lincoln Lores entitled "England's Appraisal of Lincoln" and "Lincoln Eulogized In Great Britain". (See copies attached)

During the Lincoln Sesquicentennial year British historian J. R. Pole of London University wrote a 36 page booklet entitled "Abraham Lincoln and the British Working Class", regarding contacts between Lincoln and the British trade union movement. The English speaking union enthusiastically agreed to publish the work with an introduction by Mr. Robert Willis, chairman of the Trade Union Congress; 30,000 copies were printed and distributed.

On the evening of February 12, 1959 Ambassador Whitney appeared on the popular "Tonight" program on BBC - TV. He read from John Hay's Civil War Diary and added recollections of his grandfather's association with Lincoln. An estimated 7 million people viewed the program.

One of the major projects of the Lincoln Sesquicentennial year was the locally written and produced exhibit, "Abraham Lincoln, 1809 - 1865." This 1500 square foot exhibit used 35 panels, detailed texts, 133 photos, posters and press releases to tell Lincoln's life story chronologically, highlighting the philosophy of his

thoughts upon the two major issues confronting the United States at that time--slavery and the Union. The exhibit examined Lincoln's relations with Great Britain and the sympathetic response he evoked from British trade union leaders and the workingmen. It was first shown in the Tea Centre, London, on February 12 - 28. Later, the exhibit was moved to the public library in Manchester, to the Newcastle Art Gallery, and, under the sponsorship of the English Speaking Union, on to Scotland where the Ambassador opened the exhibition in Glasgow.

A second exhibit, "Abraham Lincoln's America Today", was photo-copied to meet popular demand, and during the 10-month period it was shown in 25 British cities in art galleries, museums, libraries and civic buildings.

In 1959 England borrowed two additional valuable Lincoln collections. Ambassador Whitney arranged the long term loan of documents, letters, and other Lincoln memorabilia from the Hay-McClelland collection at Brown University. Displayed originally for four weeks in the British Museum, it was then included in the showings of the major exhibit in six cities. The other collection was that of Justin G. Turner of California.

Outstanding English tributes to Lincoln are by John Drinkwater and Lloyd George. Perhaps the finest English Lincoln tribute appeared in the London Spectator

(Circa Civil War):

"If there were an American calendar of saints, Lincoln would probably appear first on the list, and the fact that he was martyred would only be one of the reasons for his position. In Britain the name of Lincoln mentioned in a public meeting would raise a cheer more surely than the name of any other American".

France

(A report on Lincoln interest in France has been incorporated in a separate paper.) The only French tribute to Lincoln, thus far discovered, that has any semblance of being current, is that of Georges Clemenceau:

"We are here (at Springfield, Illinois) like men before one of the greatest men that ever lived, great by thought, great by feeling, and great by action".

West Germany

Since 1860 some 82 Lincoln publications in German have made their appearance. This figure indicates that more Lincoln books have appeared in German than in any other language. In fact, the first Lincoln publication in a foreign language was likely in German.

The statement has been made that "Abraham Lincoln was undoubtedly the most widely known and respected American Statesman."

West Germany today finds much immediate significance in the ideals and problems of freedom and national unity with which Lincoln was so intimately and prominently associated.

Mayor Willy Brandt has probably expressed more sentiments regarding Lincoln than any other prominent German of the present day.

In 1959 West Berlin, Bonn, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Dusseldorf all participated extensively in the observance of Lincoln's birth. American soldiers stationed in Frankfurt built a replica of Lincoln's birthplace cabin (with timber donated by a Tounus mountain village) located in front of the American Cultural Center. It is a permanent exhibit.

In West Berlin in 1959 an actual size replica of the Lincoln birthplace cabin was presented to Mayor Willy Brandt on March 13th to be permanently displayed in the city. The ceremony was attended by many German officials, educators and representatives from cultural institutions. This ceremony received wide publicity.

During the year 1959 the U. S. Embassy and the consulates used letter-sized envelopes which were imprinted with a Lincoln portrait. More than one and one-half

million envelopes were used.

In West Germany in 1959 the USIS in cooperation with the German Society for American Studies sponsored a Lincoln Essay Contest in the high schools.

It is estimated that more than two million West Germans participated in different Lincoln programs in the year 1959.

Belgium

The cultural center of the United States Information Service in Brussels is named "The Lincoln Library." It was dedicated on February 12, 1959, and officials consisted of ambassadors, consuls, U.S.I.S. officers, Belgian officials and cultural personalities. The program included a lecture on "Lincoln and the Quest For Order" by Ernest Samuels, professor of English at Northwestern University. The lecture dealt with revealing the development of Lincoln's character, political stature, and qualities of leadership through an analysis of his speeches, public statements, private notebooks, letters and anecdotes. A special exhibit of Lincolniana was displayed, and a large bust of Lincoln mounted on a specially constructed stand remained on display at the entrance of the library throughout the year.

Italy

Great interest in Lincoln has been manifested by the

Italian people since 1860. This fact is attested by the fifteen books and pamphlets that have appeared in that language.

Beginning on February 12, 1959, a flood of Lincoln material appeared in the Italian press. An incomplete check revealed that 31 daily newspapers carried items on Lincoln and 6 devoted an entire page to the anniversary.

A Lincoln exhibit was displayed at the Rome Cultural Center and newspaper coverage included all of the Rome press and out-of-town papers as far away as Sicily. The exhibit was also publicized by nightly nationwide radio and TV news reports. The Catholic Illustrated Weekly with 100,000 circulation had 4 pages of Lincoln photographs and text, including a color spread in the February 22 issue.

One Lincoln exhibit displayed in Italy showed contemporary Italian interest in Lincoln. The opportunity to link such names as Mazzini and Garibaldi to that of Lincoln established a most important community of interest.

On November 19, 1959 the Anniversary of Lincoln's delivery of the Gettysburg Address was observed. The concluding observance of Italy's Sesquicentennial activities was held on December 10 at the Campidoglio in Rome. Featured speaker was Supreme Court Justice Gaspare Ambrosini, well known throughout Italy for his interest in American affairs, who spoke on the thoughts and works of Lincoln.

Norway

Early in 1959 Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky wrote to all the foreign ambassadors in this country regarding the Lincoln Sesquicentennial program. The replies indicated a deep awareness that freedom-loving people everywhere have for Lincoln's contributions to mankind. A letter from the Ambassador of Norway called attention to the fact that a statue (bust) of Lincoln, given by the State of North Dakota to the people of Norway on July 4, 1914, stands in Frogner Park, Oslo, and that a ceremony at the statue has become a traditional part of their July 4th celebration.

Radio Free Europe

The Lincoln story is being constantly spread by radio to Free Europe. Lincoln birthday programs are sent out over the air-waves each anniversary date. In 1959 a radio adaptation in Hungarian of "Abe Lincoln in Illinois" was broadcast. As a result of Lincoln broadcasts by way of Radio Free Europe, one official was prompted to make the statement that "the name 'Lincoln' is almost as familiar to the schoolboy in Calcutta as it is to the one in Des Moines, Iowa."

Conclusion

A State Department official made the comment that "Abraham Lincoln is the most salable product this country has to offer."

Lincoln's Few English Friends and His Envoys

A BRAHAM LINCOLN was a sturdy, bred-in-the-bone American. He had known what it was to be born to conditions of hard American frontier country life, with all its privations and poverty. He had come into the world only a generation after the successful struggle for independence, and when men who had fought under Washington were as plenty about him as veterans of the war in Cuba and the Philippine insurrection are around us now.

Everything in the surroundings of Lincoln's childhood was American from the old revolutionary soldiers and old people who could remember Daniel Boone down to the bears and deer that still roamed the Kentucky mountains.

In a speech he made in 1861, before Fort Sumter was bombarded, he told how the first book he had read as a boy, aside from the Bible, was an early history of George Washington, and how it impressed him. He said:

"You all know, for you all have been boys, how these early impressions last longer than any others. I am exceedingly anxious that this Union, the Constitution and liberties of the people shall be perpetuated in accordance with the original idea for which that struggle was made, and I shall be happy, indeed, if I shall be a humble instrument, in the hands of the Almighty, and of this His almost chosen people, for perpetuating the object of that great struggle."

Every American child should have the opportunity to learn, and learn understandingly, how far and how grandly Lincoln succeeded in "perpetuating the object of that great struggle." Never before since the days when Washington had led what often seemed a hopeless fight against the British power, had any American commander in chief been called to face such a complicated, dangerous task as this simple, soulful and patriotic man of the people had to face and accomplish.

With a fierce civil war on his hands, the issue long appearing doubtful, with his rugged honesty, of purpose and straightforward habits and methods, he was obliged to meet and overcome the enmity, malice and money of the most

powerful foreign enemies and prevent their crooked diplomacy, their open aid to enemies at home and their determination ultimately to cause the destruction of the United States as a leading political power.

In a previous article it has been noted that at the outset of the Civil War the United States had but few friends in England. Those we had were staunch and true, and later on they grew in numbers. By a slip of the pen the Duke of Argyle was classed the other day as not among them, an injustice the writer hastens to correct. But, of the enemies to America, the appearance of Mr. Gladstone as one of them, was a shock to our people. He had been much admired in this country, and his surprising and bitter hostility was regretted almost as much as resented.

In a public speech he said:

"Jefferson Davis has made a nation. We may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern States."

President Lincoln knew men, and knew that the small minority of friends remaining to us in the "tight little island" ought to be encouraged and heartened. At the start, as he was well advised, they were to be found with exceptions heretofore noted, principally among the Catholic, Quaker and Non-Conformist elements of the British public.

Lincoln also believed in the potency of missionary effort. So he dispatched the Catholic Archbishop of New York, Archbishop Hughes, Bishop McIlvaine of the Episcopal Church, and Thurlow Weed, a noted political figure and newspaper man, to England, unofficially to present the facts and arguments of the American position to their friends and coreligionists.

This mission was a Presidential and private one, and no record of or report from it appears in the archives of the State Department. Yet, like most of President Lincoln's personally conducted enterprises, it did good and bore fruit, as afterward became obvious.

The work of these apostles was successful in holding our friends in line until the time came for Divine Providence to do a little intervention on its own account.

The battle of Gettysburg was fought and won, and Vicksburg surrendered. Those events made hot water bags necessary in English ministerial feet. The Proclamation of Emancipation followed with telling force. The conscience of the whole British people responded to the Declaration of Freedom, and for that epoch the horrid menace of armed European interference was banished from our view.

